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A New Philosophy For Financial Stability Regulation
Hilary J. Allen*
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed many inadequacies in the
pre-crisis approach to financial stability regulation. In the United
States, Congress responded by enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Act calls for government
agencies to make numerous rules regulating activities that have the
potential to harm financial stability, but there has been no real effort to
rethink how these rules should be assessed. The cost-benefit analysis
standard used to evaluate financial stability regulation prior to the
crisis persists today, and both the courts and Congress have sought to
further entrench that standard. However, cost-benefit analysis gives too
much primacy to the short-term interests of the financial industry and
too little to financial stability. This Article therefore rejects strict cost-
benefit analysis and develops a substitute precautionary standard for
assessing financial stability regulation, drawing analogies from the
literature on the use of the precautionary principle in regulating
complex environmental systems. A precautionary approach is more
responsive than strict cost-benefit analysis to the complexity and
fragility of the financial system, directing financial regulators to err on
the side of caution and to prioritize the stability of the financial system
over the short-term profitability of the financial sector.
This Article also considers a practical framework for precautionary
review of innovative financial products as a concrete illustration of how
the precautionary approach might be operationalized. The key
practical implication of such an approach is that it will shift the
regulatory burden to the financial industry to demonstrate why
regulation of a new product is unnecessary. As this Article
demonstrates, this burden-shifting entails many benefits, including
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mitigating issues of regulatory capture, collective action problems, and
remediating limits on regulatory funding and expertise.
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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 (the "Financial Crisis") was a
cataclysmic social event: "[s]eventeen trillion dollars in household
wealth evaporated [largely as a result of falling housing and stock
prices] within [twenty-one] months, and reported unemployment hit
10.1% at its peak in October 2009," resulting in widespread
[Vol. 45174
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bankruptcies and mortgage foreclosures. 1 Many have attributed the
severity of the Financial Crisis to thirty years of financial deregulation
in the United States:2 convinced of the efficiency, rationality, and self-
correcting nature of the financial markets, policymakers had allowed
protective regulation of those markets to be stripped away, so that when
a (somewhat) unexpected shock came in the form of the failure of the
subprime mortgage market, that shock reverberated into every crevice
of the financial system, requiring unprecedented governmental
intervention to stave off complete economic collapse. 3 The Financial
Crisis thus spurred, for many, a renewed recognition of the need for
government involvement in the financial markets, which culminated in
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank").4
The preamble to Dodd-Frank describes it as an Act designed "[t]o
promote the financial stability of the United States," 5 which reflects
some level of consensus that regulation of financial institutions and
markets is necessary to preserve the stability of the financial system.
Dodd-Frank includes a number of provisions that relate to financial
stability;6 perhaps the most controversial is section 619, known
colloquially as the "Volcker Rule."7 Broadly speaking, the Volcker
Rule seeks to ban proprietary trading by banks in order to stop them
from making risky bets with taxpayer-guaranteed funds.8 However,
despite the fact that Dodd-Frank was passed in 2010, we still don't
know all of the contours of the Volcker Rule's prohibitions (or the
details of many of Dodd-Frank's other financial stability provisions, for
that matter). This is because Congress left much of the detail of Dodd-
Frank to be embodied in administrative regulations promulgated by
1. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 389 (2011)
[hereinafter FCIC Report].
2. Id. at xviii ("More than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial
institutions .. .had stripped away key safeguards, which could have helped avoid catastrophe.").
3. DAVID M. DRIEsEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF LAW 36-49 (2012) (discussing the
economic collapse of 2008 and Congress' reaction to it).
4. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
5. Preamble, 124 Stat. at 1376.
6. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing these provisions).
7. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620.
8. This provision restricts banks' ability to engage in proprietary trading because of the fear
that, should a large and interconnected financial institution fail as a result of outsize risks taken as
part of proprietary trading activities, the consequences of that failure -being either a bailout or
systemic instability-would be borne by society at large. Simon Johnson, Will There Be a
Meaningful Volcker Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com
/2012/06/07/will-there-be-a-meaningful-volcker-rule/.
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financial regulatory agencies, and many of these regulations have yet to
be finalized. 9  Partly, this delay is due to the sheer volume of
rulemaking required of the financial regulatory agencies by Dodd-
Frank, but it can also be attributed to regulators girding for future
administrative law challenges by engaging in painstaking consultation
with the industry over the intricacies of their rulemaking. Despite the
depth of this consultation, it is expected that the regulations fleshing out
the Volcker Rule will be subject to industry attack once they are
finalized.10
In recent years, one weapon of choice for attacking administrative
rulemakings has been to challenge them in the D.C. Circuit as arbitrary
and capricious, on the grounds that the rules' quantifiable benefits do
not exceed their costs.11  While there is currently no law that specifies
that rules made by financial regulatory agencies must satisfy this strict
cost-benefit analysis standard,12 two bills introduced in the Senate last
session aimed to implement such a requirement, 13 and even in the
9. "As of July 1, 2013, a total of 279 Dodd-Frank rulemaking requirement deadlines have
passed. This is 70.1% of the 398 total rulemaking requirements." DAVIS POLK, DODD-FRANK
PROGRESS REPORT JULY 2013 2 (2013), available at http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default
/files/files/Publication/093bb6dd-6d24-4efb-a9fb-58b92085e252/Preview/PublicationAttachment
/974c57ea-eac4-4cc6-ae90-5d50991ca308/Jul2Ol3_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf.
10. See Ben Protess, Volcker Rule Divides Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/volcker-rule-divides-regulators/?ref-business (discussing the
difficulties facing regulators in drafting regulations).
11. See infra note 44 (discussing, for example, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
12. Many non-financial regulatory agencies are subject to the stringent cost-benefit analysis
requirements set out in Executive Orders 12,866 and 13,563. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
However, the independent regulatory agencies listed in 44 U.S.C. § 3502 (which include the
Federal Reserve Bank ("FRB"), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), and the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC")) are excluded from the ambit of Executive Order 12,866 by operation of
section 3(b) of that Order.
13. In September of 2011, Senator Richard Shelby, the ranking Republican member of the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, introduced a bill entitled the Financial
Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011). That bill required rigorous
cost-benefit analysis of any regulation proposed by a United States financial regulatory agency
and proposed that no regulatory action be permitted if the quantified benefits did not outweigh the
quantitative costs of that action (unless Congress granted a waiver). S. 1615 §§ 3(a)(4), 3(a)(5),
3(b)(4)(A). In August 2012, a bipartisan group of senators introduced a bill entitled the
Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2012, S. 3468, 112th Cong. (2012). This bill
authorized the President to require, by Executive Order, that the financial regulatory agencies
(other than the Federal Reserve) "assess the costs and the benefits of the intended rule and,
recognizing some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a rule only upon a
reasoned determination that the benefits of the rule justify its costs" and "base its rulemaking
decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information
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absence of such a law, the D.C. Circuit has handed down a string of
decisions that strike down administrative rulemakings as arbitrary and
capricious because of their failure "adequately to assess the economic
effects of a new rule." 14 Unfortunately, because of the difficulties
inherent in providing hard empirical evidence of the benefits of
financial stability rules, such rules (including those implementing the
Volcker Rule) are unlikely to be able to withstand the application of a
strict cost-benefit analysis standard of review, and are thus likely to be
invalidated if challenged.
The difficulties in quantifying the benefits of financial stability rules
arise because it is difficult to prove that such rules will succeed. It is
also difficult to determine how likely a financial crisis would be to
occur in the absence of any such rules, and virtually impossible to
predict the depth of social harm that such crisis would inflict.15 It thus
seems impossible to put a dollar figure on the potential benefits of
financial stability regulation. In contrast, the immediate costs of taking
regulatory action are usually readily apparent.16 As such, although
concerning the need for, and consequences of, the intended rule." S. 3468 §§ 3(a)(6)-(7). For a
discussion of the deregulatory potential of such legislation, see Ben Protess, Lawmakers Push to
Increase White House Oversight of Financial Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2012,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/lawmakers-push-to-increase-white-house-oversight-of-
financial-regulators/ (discussing how such legislation would offer the industry a path to challenge
the Dodd-Frank law). Neither bill was enacted, however.
14. Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30
YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-
2139010.
15. See Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, in
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY SYMPosIUM: THE GREENSPAN ERA: LESSONS FOR
THE FUTuRE 313, 350 (2005) (analyzing the effects of the modern financial system on society at
large). Many described the Financial Crisis as the proverbial hundred-year storm, but the
frequency of financial crises in the United States in the last 200 years suggests that they are much
more common than that; there were significant bank panics in the United States in 1837, 1857,
1873, 1907, and, of course, during the Great Depression. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick,
Regulating the Shadow Banking System 18-19 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676947) (discussing these banking panics). After the introduction of
federal deposit insurance in 1934, financial crises migrated outside of traditional banks. The
United States also saw the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 90s, and a crisis was narrowly
avoided (by a private-sector bailout) after the failure of hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management ("LTCM") in 1998 (LTCM's failure was sparked by other, international financial
crises). Indeed, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon testified his belief that financial crises will occur
every five to seven years. Sewell Chan, Voices That Dominate Wall Street Take a Meeker Tone
on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/business/
14panel.html.
16. See infra notes 6445 and accompanying text (asserting that with respect to financial
stability regulation, the ascertainable element of the cost-benefit equation is the cost of
compliance).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
there is a superficialappeal to the position that agencies should be able
to demonstrate empirically that their rules do more good than harm, the
implementation of a strict cost-benefit analysis standard of review for
financial stability regulation effectively signals a return to deregulation
and should be resisted.
Instead, we need a new standard for evaluating financial stability
regulation. This new standard of review must recognize that the
interconnections between financial actors and products are so complex
and unpredictable that regulators can never be certain their efforts will
be successful. The standard must also recognize that if regulators are
successful, there will never be any proof of that success because we will
never know how severe financial crises might have been in the absence
of regulation. And arguably most importantly, the standard must
recognize that the financial system is not an end in itself, but rather is an
auxiliary system for the broader economy; the avoidance of the
catastrophic social costs of economic failure needs to be prioritized over
the short-term profitability of financial institutions.
Fortunately, there is precedent for a regulatory approach that
addresses these types of concerns. Environmental regulators must also
grapple with complex and unpredictable systems with potentially dire
and irreversible social consequences if regulation is wrong and no
validation if regulation is right. In response to these challenges, some
environmental policymakers and academics have decided that an
alternative to strict cost-benefit analysis is required. They have
developed an approach known as the "precautionary principle," which
errs on the side of protective regulation when the outcome of an activity
is uncertain, but potentially irreversible and catastrophic.17 This is the
approach that should inform financial stability regulation in the United
States, at all levels of government: Congress should take a
precautionary approach in legislating for financial stability, financial
regulatory agencies should take a precautionary approach in drafting
and implementing rules that relate to financial stability, and the courts
should show deference when reviewing precautionary acts by financial
regulatory agencies.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I starts by
providing a working definition of "financial stability regulation," and
17. See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1315-16 (2003) (introducing the "precautionary principle" as having a
prominent role in environmental law); Douglas A. Kysar, Ecologic: Nanotechnology,
Environmental Assurance Bonding and Symmetric Humility, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
201, 203 (2010) (discussing the origin of the precautionary principle).
178 [Vol. 45
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explains why such regulation is so necessary and important. Part I will
also demonstrate that strict cost-benefit analysis is incompatible with
this type of regulation, because it focuses regulatory attention on readily
observable financial industry compliance costs, and discourages
implementation of regulation if those costs are not outweighed by
quantifiable and demonstrable benefits. As Part II will explore,
adopting a precautionary approach to financial stability is an antidote to
such a short-sighted, deregulatory agenda. In addition to prompting
regulators to look more broadly at longer-term risks within the system,
requiring a precautionary approach to financial stability regulation can
have ancillary benefits. Notably, the precautionary approach advocated
in this Article would shift the "regulatory burden of proof' so that
regulated entities are required to demonstrate why regulation of their
activities is unnecessary, instead of requiring regulators to affirmatively
demonstrate the benefits of regulating before they can do so. Inverting
the regulatory paradigm in this way would force the financial industry
to internalize some of the costs of regulating for financial stability.
Such an inversion of the onus is also likely to mitigate collective action
problems, and the cognitive capture of financial regulators by their
regulated industry. Precautionary regulation is thus better calculated to
protect the broad societal interest in preserving financial stability.
This Article does not seek to provide a detailed framework for
operationalizing the precautionary principle-the majority of the Article
speaks only in general terms about the precautionary approach financial
regulators should take when regulating financial institution activities.
However, to ground this in a more concrete context, Part III will focus
on the hot-button issue of financial innovation as a testing ground for a
precautionary approach to financial regulation. 18  Some prominent
18. As the term is used in this Article, "financial innovation" encompasses new types of
financial instruments created using advances in technology and financial theory. By way of
example, some of the key financial instrument innovations of the last three decades include
interests in money market funds; indexed mutual funds and exchange traded funds; treasury
inflation protection securities; asset-backed securities; collateralized debt obligations; interest rate
swaps; currency swaps; and credit default swaps. See Robert E. Litan, In Defense of Much, But
Not All, Financial Innovation 16-43 (Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
research/papers/2010/02/17-financial-innovation-litan (elaborating on each of these innovations
individually). Gennaioli et al. emphasize that in the innovation process, financial engineering
(including diversification, tranching, and insurance techniques) is often used to carve new types
of financial instruments out of existing types of instruments. Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert Vishny, Financial Innovation and Financial Fragility, in FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO
MATTEI NOTA DI Lavoro, No. 114.2010, 2 (May, 2010), available at http://www.feem.it/
userfiles/attach/20109211528484NDL2010-114.pdf. New financial instruments can often be
characterized alternatively as either a new type of financial instrument or as a new use of an
179
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examples of recent. financial innovations, which will be used for
illustrative purposes throughout Part III, are credit default swaps
("CDSs") and mortgage-backed securities ("MBSs"). Both of these
innovations were lionized prior to the Financial Crisis, and demonized
thereafter-in reality, as is often the case, these innovations are neither
wholly good nor wholly bad. Many of the problems associated with
CDSs and MBSs derived from improper use and overuse-financial
regulation could have checked this in the lead up to the Financial Crisis,
but regulators were co-opted by industry enthusiasm for these
products. 19  This type of groupthink was particularly effective in
preserving the non-regulated status quo prior to the Financial Crisis,20
but a precautionary approach would invert this status quo so that the
default position for regulators would be to regulate financial innovation.
In March of 2011, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") held an
illuminating research conference entitled Macro and Growth Policies in
the Wake of the Crisis. One of the panelists, Dr. Y. V. Reddy, former
existing instrument and it is difficult to demarcate the point at which a new use of an existing
instrument becomes a sui generis new instrument. Take a CDS, for example: banks could
characterize it as the sum of its building blocks (a new application (i.e., to credit) of a non-
exchange traded bilateral forward contract) rather than as a stand-alone product. See Henry T.C.
Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1466-67 (1993) (noting that end-users use "two
basic types of contracts as 'building blocks' to create a wide variety of derivatives" (citation
omitted)). As such, this Article also considers new uses of exiting instruments to be financial
innovation. The term "financial innovation" can also encompass the evolution of new types of
financial intermediaries (such as hedge funds and private equity funds). Litan, supra, at 21-22.
This Article will focus on the innovation of new instruments, but this focus by no means
discounts the effect of the evolution of new types of financial intermediaries (sometimes referred
to as the shadow banking industry) on financial stability. For further discussion of the evolution
of the shadow banking industry, see generally Gorton & Metrick, supra note 15.
19. See Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure?, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 507, 515 (2010) ("Like the bankers themselves, the regulators believed that
these innovations were making financial intermediation safer and more efficient.").
20. As one commentator pointed out:
There is little room for doubt, in my view, that the Fed under Greenspan treated the
stability, well-being and profitability of the financial sector as an objective in its own
right, regardless of whether this contributed to the Fed's legal macroeconomic mandate
of maximum employment and stable prices or to its financial stability mandate.
Although the Bernanke Fed has but a short track record ... it also may have a distorted
and exaggerated view of the importance of financial sector comfort for macroeconomic
stability.
Willem H. Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS
CITY SYMPOSIUM: MAINTAINING STABILITY IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL SYSTEM 495, 602
(2008). McDonnell & Schwarcz note that "overconfidence, confirmation bias, and groupthink at
least contributed to push the laissez-faire inclinations of the Federal Reserve toward excessive
disregard of newly emerging systemic and prudential risks." Brett McDonnell & Daniel
Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1640 (2011).
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Governor of the Bank of India, made the following remarks about
financial innovation:
A regulator has a job to try to understand innovation and regulate it,
but it doesn't mean that the innovator has the right to introduce the
innovation in the market ... if I can't understand [it] I won't permit it
until you make me understand, or until you redesign it in a way that
we can understand ... regulation has to keep on moving ahead, but
where does the burden of proof lie, and where does the risk lie?21
Shifting the burden of proof to regulated financial institutions seems
anathema to the regulatory philosophy that currently prevails in the
United States; the prevailing wisdom here is that markets, rather than
regulators, should decide whether a financial innovation should gain
traction in the markets.22  However, as this Article will explore,
Reddy's precautionary view is a necessary ingredient of effective
financial stability regulation.
21. Dr. Y. V. Reddy made his comments during a panel discussion entitled "Financial
Intermediation and Regulation," during which the panelists debated the social utility of financial
innovation and the appropriate response of financial regulation to innovation. IMF Videos,
Session III: Financial Intermediation and Regulation, INT'L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=817505940001. Dr. Reddy made this
statement approximately thirty-five minutes into the discussion.
22. Traditionally, financial regulators have shied away from making broad judgments about
whether a financial product should be allowed or not (this is often referred to as "merit
regulation"). See Litan, supra note 18, at 45. The preferred method of protecting investors from
bad investment choices has traditionally been disclosure. Information about products should be
made freely available to those considering whether to acquire/use those products, and then they
should be free to make up their own mind about the product without an agency imposing its
imprimatur on that product. The adequacy of disclosure-based regulation as it applies to
individual investors is a fascinating issue, but one that is beyond the scope of this Article. For
further discussion, see generally Steven L Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation
and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999). However,
disclosure to individual investors does not in any way address the systemic risk posed by
financial products; informing an individual about the personal risks they are subject to will not
lead them to take action so as to protect the operation of the financial system more broadly.
Stephen L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 218 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk]. In fact, complex disclosure relating to complex products may actually increase
uncertainty about what a financial product is worth, thus encouraging systemic panic in a crisis
situation. "[T]he fact that disclosure has become so complex that investors are uncertain how
much securities are worth increases the perception, if not reality, of risk." Steven L. Schwarcz,
Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 255 (2009) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity].
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I. FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATION
A. Rationale For Financial Stability Regulation
In the three decades leading up to the Financial Crisis, regulators and
the general public placed increasing faith in the ability of the financial
system to work efficiently without any need for regulatory
intervention.23 However, that faith was abruptly shattered with the fall
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, when it became abundantly
clear that government intervention was needed to prevent the total
collapse of the financial system. Thus, in the wake of the Financial
Crisis, renewed attention has been paid to "financial stability
regulation." 24 Financial stability regulation is targeted at the activities
of financial institutions with the aim of preventing such institutions (and
markets generally) from collapsing in a manner that damages the
broader economy.25  It encompasses a broad range of measures
implemented by Dodd-Frank including regulatory capital requirements
for banks, mandatory clearing of certain financial derivative
instruments, and the Volcker Rule.2 6 In the future, financial stability
regulation may also come to encompass new proposals to maintain the
stability of the financial system, such as the measures to regulate
financial innovation discussed in the conclusion.
To appreciate the importance of financial stability regulation, one
must understand the linkages between the financial system and the real
23. DRIESEN, supra note 3, at 36-37.
24. In the United States, an alphabet soup of financial regulators (including the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the SEC, the CFTC and the FDIC) has been directed
by Dodd-Frank to consider financial stability issues in their rulemaking activities. With regard to
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, see, for example, Dodd-Frank sections
161-163, 165-167, 607, 802, 805, 807-808 and 1104. With regard to the FDIC, see, for
example, Dodd-Frank sections 203, 206 and 210. The CFTC and the SEC have been charged
with considering financial stability issues when determining whether someone is a "major swap
participant" or a "major security-based swap participant" See Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 721, 761,
124 Stat. 1376, 1658-72, 1754-59 (2010). All of these agencies have been directed to consider
financial stability in devising the rules implementing the Volcker Rule.
25. William A. Allen & Geoffrey Wood, Defining and Achieving Financial Stability, 2 J. FIN.
STABILITY 152, 152-53 (2006). Much of the recent literature on financial stability regulation
uses the term "macroprudential" to describe regulation that aims to protect the safety and
soundness of the entire financial system. See, e.g., Samuel G. Hanson et al., A Macroprudential
Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (2011) (defining a macroprudential
approach as one which "recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects, and seeks to
safeguard the financial system as a whole"). However, given that microprudential regulation
(which focuses on the safety and soundness of individual institutions, rather than the system as a
whole) can also assist in preserving financial stability, this Article prefers to use the term
"financial stability regulation" in place of "macroprudential regulation."
26. See §§ 171, 619, 711-774, 124 Stat. at 1435, 1620, 1641-47 (2010).
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economy. The primary function of the financial system is to
intermediate capital-that is, to connect those who want to earn a return
on money with those who need money for productive purposes and are
willing to pay for such money.27 Capital intermediation often takes the
form of the provision of credit, and that credit is key to the growth of
the broader economy: new businesses cannot start and existing
businesses cannot expand without it.28 Because the financial system is
the primary provider of credit and other capital intermediation,29 a
financial crisis impacts the access of the broader economy to credit and,
in turn, economic growth. 30 A crisis will also impede the ability of the
financial system to perform its other socially useful activities, including
the management of risk, the elucidation and dissemination of
information about companies, and the provision of a system for
payments. 3 1 The precarious economic climate that lingered after the
27. "The primary function of any financial system is to facilitate the allocation and
deployment of economic resources, both spatially and temporally, in an uncertain environment."
Robert C. Merton, A Functional Perspective of Financial Intermediation, 24 FIN. MGMT. 23, 23
(1995) (emphasis in original); see also Litan, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing the main functions of
finance); Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV.
779, 787 n.29 (2011) ("Financial institutions create value for society in their role as
intermediaries.").
28. Restrictions on lending following a crisis are disproportionately likely to affect small and
medium businesses. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT:
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 146-47 (2009).
29. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Summary of Are Banks Special?, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS
(Jan. 1, 1983), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications-papers/pub-display.cfm?id=684
(noting that banks are the "backup source of liquidity to all other institutions, financial and
nonfinancial"). "Banks enable people to borrow money, and, today, by operating electronic-
transfer systems, they allow commerce to take place without notes and coins changing hands.
They also play a critical role in channeling savings into productive investments.... [M]any
businesses rely on the banks to fund their day-to-day operations." John Cassidy, What Good is
Wall Street?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/
11/29/101129fa fact cassidy?currentPage=all.
30. During the Financial Crisis, the problems on Wall Street began to affect other sectors of
the economy when businesses and local governments were no longer able to obtain credit.
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 77, 90 (2009); see also REINHART AND ROGOFF, supra note 28, at xliv ("This strong
connection between financial markets and real economic activity, particularly when financial
markets cease to function, is what has made so many of the crises ... such spectacular historic
events.").
31. Merton, supra note 27, at 24; see also Litan, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing the main
functions of finance); Utset, supra note 27, at 787-88 (noting that although financial institutions
are critical to economy, they come with a number of risks); Adair Turner, Lecture at CASS
Business School: What Do Banks Do, What Should They Do and What Public Policies Are
Needed to Ensure Best Results for the Real Economy? 2-3 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/at_17marl0.pdf (discussing financial system activities).
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Financial CrisiS32 is an uncomfortably salient illustration of what
happens to the growth of the real economy when the stability of the
financial system is compromised. 33
In an ideal world, financial institutions would carry on their activities
in ways that minimize the risk they pose to the stability of the financial
system, and thus the broader economy. However, individual financial
institutions have little incentive to preserve financial stability, because
the benefits of such stability accrue to society as a whole and are hard
for individual financial institutions to appropriate. 34 Not only do
financial institutions lack incentives to reduce the amount of risk in the
financial system, they also lack the information and tools to do so-
evaluation of systemic risk requires a broad oversight of all financial
institutions, and systemic risk reduction requires coordination amongst
financial institutions. 35 Individual financial institutions have limited
information about their competitors' positions, and cannot force their
competitors to act in certain ways. The result is that the task of
overseeing and regulating financial stability cannot be carried out by the
32. See Paul A. Volcker, The William Taylor Memorial Lecture: Three Years Later:
Unfinished Business in Financial Reform 5 (Sept. 23, 2011) ("[Flour years after the first
intimations of the sub-prime mortgage debacle, high indebtedness and leverage, impaired banking
capital, and a pervasive loss of confidence in a number of major financial institutions constrict an
easy flow of credit to smaller businesses, potential homebuyers and consumers alike.").
33. The type of financial crisis discussed in this Article is akin to the "banking crisis" defined
by Reinhart and Rogoff:
[W]e mark a banking crisis by two types of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the
closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial
institutions ... and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover or large-
scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of
institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial
institutions.
REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 10.
34. Hu, supra note 18, at 1502. In this sense, financial stability can be conceived of as a
classic positive externality. Equally, financial instability affects society as a whole and thus can
be conceived of as a negative externality resulting from the activities of financial institutions. See
THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 29 (1999) (noting that "problems at one
financial institution could be transmitted to other institutions ... increase[ing] the likelihood of a
general breakdown in the functioning of financial markets"); Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the
Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J.
ON REG. 253, 258 (2007) (asserting that the purposes of financial regulation include protection of
the public and elimination of negative externalities from financial failures); Schwarcz, Systemic
Risk, supra note 22, at 206 (asserting that regulation of systemic risk "appears not only
appropriate, but necessary").
35. Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation 43 (Cardozo Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 329, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1805018.
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private sector, and has thus fallen to the financial regulatory agencies.36
B. Why a Strict Cost-Benefit Analysis Approach to Financial Stability
Regulation is Problematic
In the United States, financial regulatory agencies have the power to
promulgate rules that aim to preserve financial stability.37 These rules
are not currently required to conform to what this Article will refer to as
"strict cost-benefit analysis" 38 (i.e., the agencies are not required to
demonstrate, using empirical evidence, that the benefits of their rules
outweigh their costs), 39 but financial regulatory agencies nonetheless
tend to provide a cost-benefit analysis of their rules. 40 For some
financial regulatory agencies, economic analysis of their rules is
required by law, although the level of analysis required stops short of
what would be required to satisfy a strict cost-benefit analysis
standard.41 For other financial regulatory agencies, the performance of
36. Id. ("Systemic risk regulation is an example where regulators cannot look to private
regulatory strategies. Regulators cannot expect that private actors will be capable of identifying
how the actions of individual firms may make the financial system less stable.").
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting the existence of such rules in the United
States). It should be noted that these rulemaking powers can only be exercised within the limits
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. 70-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
38. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (examining the imposition of strict cost-
benefit analysis requirements on regulatory agencies).
39. Cost-benefit analysis can encompass a spectrum of methodologies, ranging from this more
rigid cost-benefit approach, which would seek "to ensure that all regulatory statutes are
implemented by reference to the principle of economic efficiency based on the criterion of private
willingness to pay," to a more lax version that could be viewed as "an effort to require balancing
rather than absolutism." Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-
Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 253 (1996).
40. The Federal Reserve Board is subject to very few requirements to perform economic
analysis of its rules. Nevertheless, the Office of Inspector General reported that "[t]he Board's
General Counsel told us that the Board conducts its rulemaking activities in a manner that is
generally consistent with the philosophy and principles outlined in Executive orders [imposing
stringent CBA requirements on other agencies]." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., RESPONSE TO A
CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST REGARDING THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIED
RULEMAKINGS 6-7, 9 (2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/
files/Congressional Responseweb.pdf.
41. Some individual financial regulatory agencies are subject to (non-homogenous) statutory
requirements to consider the economic costs of their regulations, but these do not require strict
empirical cost-benefit analysis. For example, the CFTC is required by statute to consider the
costs and benefits of its rules before it issues them. 7 U.S.C. § 19(a) (2012). The SEC must
consider the impacts of its rules on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 15 U.S.C. §§
78c(f), 78w(a)(2) (2012). For a comprehensive discussion of requirements for the SEC to
perform economic analysis of its rules, see Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC's Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 1 (2006).
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any economic analysis is currently voluntary.42 However, two bills
were introduced in the Senate last session (one with bipartisan support)
that aimed to legislatively entrench a strict cost-benefit approach to
financial regulation in the United States.43 While these bills ultimately
did not become law, the push for strict cost-benefit review of all
financial stability regulation is by no means over, and financial
regulatory agencies currently face the prospect of the D.C. Circuit
imposing such a standard indirectly, by invalidating as arbitrary and
capricious any agency rulemakings that do not conform to the Court's
ideals of strict, empirical cost-benefit analysis. 44 But strict cost-benefit
analysis of financial stability regulation is inappropriate for a number of
reasons. First, it encourages regulatory timidity; smaller, more detailed
regulatory steps are more likely to withstand strict cost-benefit review
than broad-brush rules. Unfortunately, overly-detailed regulation will
often be ineffective 45 or, worse still, destabilize the financial system by
42. See supra note 40 (noting the Office of the Inspector General's tendency to perform
economic analysis of its rules, despite the fact that such analysis is not required).
43. See supra note 13 (discussing the two bills which were introduced in 2011 and 2012).
44. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir.
2011), is indicative of that court's tendency to invalidate as arbitrary and capricious agency
rulemakings that it views as being based on flawed economic analysis. The background to the
Business Roundtable decision is as follows: the Business Roundtable is a business industry
association that (together with the Chamber of Commerce) sought to challenge a proxy access
rule made by the SEC that "require[d] public companies to provide shareholders with information
about, and their ability to vote for, shareholder-nominated candidates for the board of directors."
Id. at 1146. The Business Roundtable's chief argument against the rule was that the SEC
"neglected both to quantify the costs companies would incur opposing shareholder nominees and
to substantiate the rule's predicted benefits," id. at 1149, and that the rule was therefore arbitrary
and capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
The D.C. Circuit concurred with the Business Roundtable and vacated the rule on the grounds
that the SEC "inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed
adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified;
neglected to support its predictive judgments." Id. at 1148-49. Of course, this decision is not
necessarily predictive of how the D.C. Circuit will rule in future cases involving financial
stability regulations. For one thing, the SEC's proxy access rule was a corporate governance
measure rather than a financial stability measure. Nonetheless, the proxy access rule was
expressly authorized by section 971 of Dodd-Frank, and the D.C. Circuit's decision to invalidate
the rule for inadequate cost-benefit analysis does not bode well for future challenges to rules
made pursuant to Dodd-Frank that are related to financial stability. Some have argued that the
D.C. Circuit's economic analysis was also flawed and that the strict cost-benefit standard was
misapplied in the name of judicial activism. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie,
The Bizarre Law & Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CoRP. L. 101 (2012).
45. "In complex environments, decision rules based on one, or a few, good reasons can trump
sophisticated alternatives. Less may be more." Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability,
Member, Fin. Policy Comm. & Vasileios Madouros, Economist, Bank of Eng., Speech at Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City's 36th Economic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee
(Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2012/ah.pdf.
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adding further complexity to an already complicated environment.46
The Volcker Rule serves as a cautionary tale here. As enacted in the
Dodd-Frank legislation, the rule was a reasonably broad and
precautionary legislative prohibition on proprietary trading (albeit with
some exceptions). However, the efficacy of such a ban is likely to be
eviscerated by the overly complex implementing regulations that are
being prepared with an eye to expected legal challenges from the
financial industry.47 Drafts of these implementing regulations provide
incredibly detailed and prescriptive descriptions of the types of market-
making and risk-mitigating hedging activities that will be permitted as
exceptions to the Volcker Rule's ban on proprietary trading:48
inevitably, some of these permitted activities will prove problematic,
and as the deficiencies of the existing regulations become evident, new
regulations will be incrementally layered upon the old ones to address
those deficiencies. This plethora of detailed rules will add more
destabilizing complexity to the financial system, as well as create
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.49
To avoid these sorts of outcomes, the United States should adopt an
alternative standard that would allow financial regulatory agencies to
promulgate simpler, broader rules that are better calculated to preserve
financial stability. This alternative standard needs to recognize that the
benefits of financial stability regulation go beyond avoiding the
immediate dollar costs of financial crises (such as government bail-
outs): financial crises are destructive of confidence in the financial
system and this confidence is a prerequisite for the provision of credit
and a properly functioning economy. 50 A financial crisis thus becomes
46. "[T]rying to regulate a market entangled by complexity [by adding layers of protection
and regulation] can lead to unintended consequences, compounding crises rather than
extinguishing them because the safeguards add even more complexity, which in turn feeds more
failure." RIcHARD BOOKSTABBER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS
AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 146 (2007). See generally J.B. Ruhl & James
Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative
State, 91 GEO L.J. 757 (2003) (theorizing that regulatory accretion increases noncompliance by
changing how the regulatory system operates).
47. Haldane & Madouros, supra note 45, at 23; Protess, supra note 10.
48. Protess, supra note 10.
49. Regulatory arbitrage has been the source of many recent financial innovations, resulting in
increased complexity of the financial system. See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the
Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 267 (2012) ("[I]nsofar as
financial innovation is employed as a reflexive response to changes in the prevailing regulatory
environment, both this innovation and the regulation which spawned it can be viewed as
contributing to the complexity of modem financial markets.").
50. Hilary J. Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 125, 141-
43 (2012). The strict cost-benefit approach to financial regulation has been criticized for its
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a broader economic crisis, and so government debt tends to explode in
its wake.51 Increased government debt can, in turn, create political
pressure to institute austerity measures with resulting broad social
hardship.52 Even without the implementation of austerity measures, the
social costs that flow from financial crises are devastating 53-the
aftermath of financial crises is usually characterized by significant
declines in employment and increases in poverty that can ultimately
impact health and safety. 54 But it is still very difficult to put a dollar
value on the benefit of avoiding the social costs of financial crises, and
so a strict cost-benefit assessment of financial regulation gives short
shrift to the true benefits of preserving financial stability. 55
Even if economists could agree on dollar values that represented the
assumed value of avoiding or mitigating a financial crisis, 56 it is still
inability to properly quantify the benefits of investor confidence. Peter H. Huang, Emotional
Impact Analysis in Financial Regulation: Going Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis 1 (Temple Univ.
Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2006-21, 2006), available at http://www.sss.ias.edu/
files/papers/econpaper62.pdf.
51. The economic contractions that follow a financial crisis often impose high costs on society
in the form of reduced tax revenues. These costs are likely to dwarf the costs of any bailout in a
financial crisis. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 142, 224. The Congressional Budget
Office has estimated that the United States incurred an additional $7 trillion in government debt
as a direct result of the recession following the Financial Crisis. Simon Johnson, Where is the
Volcker Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/
where-is-the-volcker-rule/?ref-business.
52. See, e.g., Liz Alderman, In Ireland, Austerity Is Praised but Painful, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/business/global/despite-praise-for-its-austerity-ireland
-and-its-people-are-being-battered.html?_r-1&scp=4&sq=austerity&st--cse (analyzing how
austerity efforts in Ireland hurt the fragile economy); Suzanne Daley, Fiscal Crisis Takes Toll on
Health of Greeks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/world/
europe/greeks-reeling-from-health-care-cutbacks.html?ref=greece (discussing the damage that
cost-saving measures are doing to the healthcare system in Greece); Julia Werdigier, Young
Britons Are Willing, But Few Jobs Are in Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/business/global/britons-are-young-ready-and-willing-but-
few-jobs-in-sight.html?_r-l&ref=business (detailing rising unemployment rates in Britain as
result of budget cuts designed to deal with European Debt Crisis).
53. Jackson, supra note 34, at 288.
54. "The unemployment rate rises an average of 7 percentage points during the down phase of
the cycle, which lasts on average more than four years." REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 28, at
224.
55. "Failure of the financial system can generate social costs in the form of widespread
poverty and unemployment, which in turn can destroy lives and foster crime ... preserving
stability [of the financial system] would prevent the breakdown [of the financial system] that
could lead to health and safety concerns." Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 22, at 207.
56. In the environmental sphere, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has
responded to requirements that regulation withstand strict cost-benefit analysis by developing
Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses, which set out, inter alia, "guidelines for assessing
the benefits of environmental policies including various techniques of valuing risk-reduction and
other benefits" and "the basic theoretical approach for assessing the costs of environmental
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unlikely that strict cost-benefit analysis would capture the true benefits
of financial stability regulation. This is because the financial system is
so complex that it is impossible to prove that financial stability
regulation will succeed in avoiding or mitigating crises.57  This
complexity derives in part from the numerous actors involved in the
financial system (ranging from retail depositors, to regulators, to large
financial institutions-the latter of which are themselves very complex
organizations), 58 the level of interconnection between those actors, and
the unpredictable, sometimes even irrational, behavior of those
interconnected actors. 59 In addition to the complexity surrounding the
actors in the financial. system, the different products in the financial
system are themselves numerous, interconnected and often complex.60
Accordingly, complexity in the financial system is exponential: it is
policies and describes how this can be applied in practice." NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON.,
OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC
ANALYSES 1-6 (2010). Presumably, if financial stability regulation were to be subjected to the
same stringent cost-benefit analysis requirements as environmental regulation, economists would
attempt to create similar guidelines for economic analyses of financial stability regulations.
However, it is by no means clear that such an approach would accurately capture the costs and
benefits of systemic risk regulation-there is a broad literature criticizing this approach in the
environmental area. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 40 (2004) ("In practice,
most cost-benefit analyses could more accurately be described as 'complete cost-incomplete
benefit' studies. Most or all of the costs are readily determined market prices, but many
important benefits cannot be meaningfully quantified or priced, and are therefore implicitly given
a value of zero.").
57. "Unfortunately, since we do not know the probability of a potentially catastrophic
meltdown of the financial sector (though it is likely to be small), it is hard to do a precise cost-
benefit analysis." Rajan, supra note 15, at 350. It should be noted, however, that some work is
currently being undertaken to model the ability of financial regulators to reduce the risk of
financial crises. See, e.g., Piergiorgio Alessandri et al., Towards a Framework for Quantifying
Systemic Stability, INT'L J. CENT. BANKING, Sept. 2009, at 47, 53-68. Schwarcz has noted that
these types of models might: "perceive and account for the 'observable and systematic'
behavioral patterns that emerge as usually diverse market segments begin moving in lockstep, or
where investors exhibit herding behavior." Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at
246.
58. See Utset, supra note 27, at 799 (explaining the complexities of modern financial
institutions and the difficulty that arises because of them).
59. Id. at 797-98 ("A system's complexity is thus a function of the computational and
interpretive difficulty experienced by an individual in transforming raw information about its
components into usable information about the system. Two things can increase the cognitive load
of computing and interpreting information about a system: the number of parts or components
involved; and the way that these components interact with each other.").
60. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at 214 (describing the complexity of
modern investment securities, Schwarcz comments that "[c]omplexity [of assets] derives from the
intricate combining of parts, creating complications that increase the likelihood that failures will
occur and diminish the ability of investors and other market participants to anticipate and avoid
these failures").
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difficult to understand the different financial actors and products, it is
harder to understand how these different actors and products are
interconnected, and given the levels of unpredictability and irrationality
displayed by financial actors, it is harder still to understand how they
(and their products) will interact with each other-particularly in a time
of crisis.61
In such a complex system that defies predictability, 62 regulators
struggle to demonstrate the impact of their financial stability
regulations-how can a regulatory agency show that a financial crisis
would have occurred but for its efforts? 63 Furthermore, regulators have
little hope of putting a dollar figure on the "benefit" of financial
stability that will derive from their rulemakings. Regulations
implementing the Volcker Rule (and other financial stability measures)
thus seem doomed to fail if evaluated on a strict cost-benefit analysis
basis.
Instead, strict cost-benefit analysis gives primacy to what can be
readily observed, replicated, and quantified.64  In the context of
financial stability regulation, the one relatively certain element of the
cost-benefit equation is the cost that financial institutions will need to
61. Market participants will make their own (rational or irrational) assessments of what is
happening in the markets and then modify their behavior accordingly. See, e.g., Hu, supra note
18, at 1500 (discussing that financial agents' approaches are less based on science as they are on
the agent's personal perception and beliefs in the market at the point of the transaction); Jeffrey
M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity, Causation, Law, and
Judgment, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299, 321-23 (2010) (emphasizing the influence that the
market agents have on the entire system, and the social science behind predicting market changes
and of economics in general); Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at 238
(explaining the processes and decisions that investors use in financial-market analysis).
62. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at 220 (describing that such
complexities "obscure the ability of market participants to see and judge consequences").
63. See Jackson, supra note 34, at 260 ("Benefits from the elimination of externalities
are, if anything, more difficult to measure. Systemic risks are low-probability, high-impact
events. Regulatory interventions, in theory, have the potential to reduce the probability of
these events and also diminish their severity. But how effective any particular intervention
is on these two dimensions is difficult to tell. It requires information about a counterfactual
situation: How likely is it that a systemic shock would have occurred in the absence of
regulatory intervention, and how severe would the shock have been in an unregulated
environment? Even ex post, the absence of systemic shocks does not provide particularly
valuable information about the benefits of regulatory intervention because shocks may also
not have occurred in the absence of regulation.").
64. See Huang, supra note 50, at 47 ("[E]conomists have a methodological preference for or
bias towards building models that have as their data or inputs variables which can be objectively
measured and verified. . . ."). But see Dana, supra note 17, at 1338 ("[J]ust because a risk is
currently not susceptible to a defensible quantification does not, by itself, make it reasonable to
ignore.").
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bear in order to comply with that regulation. If compliance costs are
given primacy because of their susceptibility to empirical analysis, then
they will outweigh the more uncertain benefits of regulation. A strict
cost-benefit approach to financial stability regulation is therefore likely
to favor the absence of regulation. 65 Financial stability can only be
addressed by regulation, however, 66 and the consequences of financial
instability are potentially catastrophic. 67 As such, we need to move
away from strict cost-benefit analysis of financial stability regulation.
As Calabresi noted:
the question of whether a given law is worth its costs .. . is rarely
susceptible to empirical proof. This does not mean, of course, that the
best we can do is adopt a laissez faire policy and the let the market do
the best it can. It is precisely the province of good government to
make guesses as to what laws are likely to be worth their costs.
Hopefully it will use what empirical information is available and seek
to develop empirical information which is not currently available....
But there is no reason to assume that in the absence of conclusive
information no government action is better that some action ... in
uncertainty increase the chances of correcting an error ... 68
II. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
REGULATION
Counterpoised as an alternative to strict cost-benefit analysis is the
precautionary principle. 69  This principle is essentially a more
sophisticated version of the old adage, "better safe than sorry,"
counseling regulators to err on the side of regulating an activity when
the outcome of that activity is uncertain, but potentially irreversible and
catastrophic. The principle has primarily been used and discussed as a
basis for environmental regulation; 70 to date, there has been very little
65. See Huang, supra note 50, at 37 ("[S]ome other concerns about CBA of non-financial
regulations, such as its potential for anti-regulatory bias ... also may apply to CBA of securities
regulations.").
66. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
68. Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules - A
Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 70 (1968).
69. See, eg., Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10790, 10796 (2001) (describing the basis of the precautionary principle and its possible
benefits).
70. The precautionary principle has found favor in international and European environmental
law. See, for example, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which
expressly directs nation states to embrace the precautionary principle. United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12,
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discussion of the principle in the context of financial regulation.71
However, in many respects, the complex interconnected network of
actors and products in the financial system bears striking similarity to
the natural environment, and financial and environmental systems share
the potential for low-probability, but catastrophic, failures. 72 Because
of these similarities, environmental law scholarship provides some
useful insights that can be applied in developing a precautionary
standard for financial stability regulation.
A. Similarities between Environmental and Financial Stability
Regulation
Parsing through the literature on the regulation of financial systems
and environmental systems, it is hard not to be struck by the similarities
between the two. The financial system and environmental systems
(such as coral reefs and the global climate) share similar characteristics
as a result of the number and complexity of their component parts and
the feedback loops that characterize the interactions of those component
parts.73 These systems "give rise to stunningly complex and difficult-
to-predict interactions," 74 and as a result, regulators are, to some extent,
working in the realm of Knightian uncertainty.75 Complexity and
1992); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1003,
1007 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary] (analyzing the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, art. 174, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C340) 3, which provides that that EU
environmental regulation "shall be based on the precautionary principle"). Policymakers in the
United States have traditionally been less enamored of the precautionary principle.
71. A recent article by Saule Omarova includes a rare discussion of the precautionary
principle in the context of financial regulation. She notes that while "[iut is not the goal of [her]
Article to advocate direct application of any particular formulation of precautionary principle to
financial services regulation ... adopting and operationalizing the general concept ofprecaution
in the context of post-crisis financial systemic risk regulation may be a worthwhile, and even
necessary, exercise." Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex
Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 64, 85 (2012) (emphasis in original); see also
DRIESEN, supra note 3, at 8 (supporting a precautionary approach to financial regulation in his
book).
72. For a general discussion of some of the similarities between the financial system and
ecosystems, see Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems,
469 NATURE 351 (2011).
73. See Kysar, supra note 17, at 215 ("[Iln addition to sensitivity to minor variations in
conditions, complex systems also are characterized by feedback and feedforward loops, in which
system components influence other components that, in turn, cause their own effects on the
original, as well as many other, components within the system.").
74. Id.
75. Knight distinguished between situations where probabilities could be assigned to certain
risks, and situations that were so uncertain that the risks were unknowable. Thus, to paraphrase
Donald Rumsfeld, a situation subject to Knightian uncertainty deals with "unknown unknowns"
rather than "known unknowns." FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20
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unpredictability heighten regulators' "difficulty of assessing whether
perceived ... threats actually will result in harm, and if so, how much
harm and... of assessing whether available regulatory tools and
technology will in fact result in the avoidance of any harms that might
otherwise result." 76 The regulatory task is further complicated because
regulation of complex systems is often less concerned with the ordinary
functioning of those systems, and more focused on what happens in
lower-probability, higher-impact crisis circumstances (known as "fat-
tail" events), 77 when rational assumptions about the operation of
complex systems and the interactions of system components are less
likely to hold. If any of these financial or environmental systems do fail
during fat-tail events, the consequences are likely to be irreversible78
and catastrophic. 79
Just as with financial stability regulation,80 the costs of
environmental regulation are usually immediately obvious, whereas
environmental regulators are often unable to demonstrate the "benefit"
(1921).
76. Dana, supra note 17, at 1322; see also Kysar, supra note 17, at 211 (noting that "a long
recognized hallmark feature of [environmental, health and safety regulation] has been the
informational and cognitive limitations that face any regulator's ability to identify, understand,
and predict the consequences of risk creating activities, including the act of regulation itself').
77. "[These systems] typically have 'fat tails,' in which large or even extreme events appear
with a regularity that would be unthinkable from the perspective of normal probability
assumptions." Kysar, supra note 17, at 216 (citing Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving
Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 155
(2003)).
78. While the consequences of an environmental disaster may seem more irreversible than
those of a financial crisis (for example, once a species is extinct, this cannot be reversed), the
social consequences of the recessions that follow deep financial crises are lasting,
notwithstanding that the broader economy will eventually cycle into a more prosperous time. For
example, in the wake of the Financial Crisis, there has been much talk of a "lost generation" of
young people who have been unable to find work and may never develop the skills and
experience necessary to establish long-term employment. Because of uncertainty about long-term
employment, this "lost generation" has put off life decisions such as marriage, home-buying and
procreation. See, e.g., Adam Clark Estes, More Signs that American Youth Are a Lost
Generation, ATLANTIC WIRE, Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2011/09/
american-youth-lost-generation/42814/; Robert J. Samuelson, Is the Economy Creating a Lost
Generation?, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 9, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
robert-samuelson-is-the-economy-creating-a-lost-generation/2012/12/09/41683956-4093- 11e2-
bca3-aadc9b7e29c5_story.htnl. For further discussion of the application of the precautionary
principle to theoretically reversible risks, see Dana, supra note 17, at 1316.
79. With regard to the financial system, see text accompanying notes 53-55. See also Cass
Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 842 (2006) (providing
examples of catastrophic failures of environmental systems potentially include species extinction
and global warming).
80. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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side of the regulatory equation-in terms of the catastrophes that may
be prevented-to the levels of proof required by strict cost-benefit
analysis.8 1 Proponents of the precautionary principle in the
environmental sphere take the view that, in the face of such Knightian
uncertainty, regulators should be permitted to make value judgments
about the propriety of regulatory action.82  Such a precautionary
approach seems apt as a guiding principle for both financial and
environmental regulation.
Of course, there is a limit to the parallels that can be drawn between
environmental and financial stability regulation. 83  Environmental
regulation does lay a stronger claim to a precautionary approach
because it is directly aimed at avoiding threats to health, life, and safety.
Financial stability regulation instead has the primary goal of avoiding
threats to the economy. However, economic failure has secondary
consequences for health, life, and safety, which can be dire. 84 The
magnitude of these social costs is sufficient to justify employing a
precautionary approach to financial stability regulation, notwithstanding
that financial crises may be less calamitous than environmental
disasters. A precautionary approach is particularly justified if the cost
of financial stability regulation (measured in terms of the cost to society
as a whole, rather than focusing on the private compliance costs borne
by financial institutions) is not overly high.85
81. See Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic
Climate Change, 91 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1, 18 (2009) (arguing that "[tihe economics of fat-
tailed catastrophes raises difficult conceptual issues that cause the analysis to appear less
scientifically conclusive and more contentiously subjective than what comes out of an empirical
CBA of more thin-tailed situations. But if this is the way things are with fat tails, then this is the
way things are.... Perhaps in the end the climate-change economist can help most by not
presenting a cost-benefit estimate . .. as if it is accurate and objective." (emphasis in original)).
82. Kysar, supra note 17, at 235.
83. See supra note 78 (discussing that the concept of "irreversibility" may apply differently in
different types of systems; also, advances in the natural sciences may provide more certainty as to
the operation of environmental systems, and therefore more certainty about how to regulate the
system.). But cf Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at 237 (arguing that the
"science" of financial markets is not replicable or susceptible to precise scientific evaluation-for
this reason, the argument for the use of the precautionary principle with respect to financial
regulation may actually be stronger than for environmental risks that have become "known"
rather than "uncertain," through scientific research).
84. Financial collapse can lead to widespread increases in unemployment, poverty and crime,
which may indirectly cause death and disease. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 22, at 224.
85. By way of illustration, Part IV.B of this Article will consider what benefits would be
foregone if a precautionary approach to regulating financial innovation were adopted.
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B. Formulation of a Precautionary Principle for Financial Stability
Regulation
In devising a precautionary principle to inform financial stability
regulation, it is helpful to look at the formulations of the precautionary
principle that have been elucidated from the environmental literature by
Sunstein. Sunstein identifies three different "strengths" of the
precautionary principle. The weakest version of the precautionary
principle can be expressed as the notion that "lack of decisive evidence
of harm should not be grounds for refusing to regulate." 86 This weak-
form precautionary principle is a prerequisite to any financial stability
regulation because given the uncertainty that flows from the complexity
of the financial system, it is impossible to show conclusively that
certain activities will harm financial stability. 87 A stronger formulation
of the precautionary principle is the position that where activities can
pose great harm, precautionary regulation should be employed that
effectively shifts the burden to prove that the activity should be
permitted to the proponent of that activity, rather than forcing the
regulator to make the case for why regulation is necessary.88 The
strongest form of the precautionary principle dictates that the potential
for great harm justifies any regulatory intervention, and/or that the
proponent of an activity must conclusively demonstrate that the activity
is safe before it is allowed. 89 This Article advocates the stronger, but
not the strongest, form of the precautionary principle. The uncertainties
in the financial system are inherent; no financial activity can
86. Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary, supra note 70, at 1012.
87. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
88. See Dana, supra note 17, at 1315 (discusses shifting the burden of proof to proponents
when facing risk); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global Warming, Terrorism,
and Other Problems, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 3, 6 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Irreversible and
Catastrophic] (suggesting that the burden of proof should be shifted to the proponent of the
activity).
89. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 17, at 243 (stating that an activity can be banned until it is
adequately shown that there is no significant risk); Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary, supra note
70, at 1013 ("[T]he precautionary principle means 'that action should not be taken to correct a
problem as soon as there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the harm has already
occurred."' (quoting Paul McFedries, Precautionary Principle, WORD SPY, Jan. 23, 2002,
http://www.wordspy.com/words/precautionaryprinciple.asp)); Sunstein, Irreversible and
Catastrophic, supra note 88, at 6 ("The precautionary principle mandates where there is a risk of
significant damage to others or to future generations, then decisions should be made to prevent
such activities ... until scientific evidence shows that the damage will not occur." (quoting The
Cloning ofHumans and Genetic Modifications: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations,
10 7th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth))).
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conclusively be proved safe, and therefore, using the strongest form of
the precautionary principle would incapacitate regulators, preventing
them from allowing any financial activities. 90
Importantly, use of the stronger-form precautionary principle in
financial stability regulation does not mean that regulators should ignore
the costs imposed by such regulation. 91 While this Article advocates a
move away from strict cost-benefit analysis, a flexible analysis of the
costs and benefits of regulation should still be performed although "the
burden of proof [has been shifted] to proponents of regulatory
inaction." 92 Rather than adhering to a strict monetization of costs and
benefits, this Article's precautionary approach would accept that
maintaining a stable financial system greatly benefits society93 and that
the fiscal and monetary remedies available after a crisis are costly,9 4
while acknowledging that neither of these can be accurately reflected as
a dollar amount. Nonetheless, these benefits must be weighed against
the costs of the regulation, both in terms of immediate quantifiable
short-term costs and long-term unquantifiable costs in the sense of
foregone benefits (the latter of which should also be considered from a
precautionary perspective). 95  While cost-benefit analysis and the
90. Regulators would be stymied by the strongest form of the precautionary principle because
by blocking any new activity for failing to satisfy an impossibly high burden of proof, they would
necessarily block the benefits of these new activities, and blocking the benefits of activities is an
inadvertent harm that the regulators cannot endorse.
91. E.g., Dana, supra note 17, at 1316 (suggesting that the precautionary principle should be
considered as a complement to cost-benefit analysis); Kysar, supra note 17, at 203-20 (claiming
that the precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis are not meant to be competitive theories,
but complementary).
92. Dana, supra note 17, at 1315.
93. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 22, at 235 (commenting that the benefits of
financial stability regulation can be viewed as the costs saved by avoiding systemic risk-these
are high, because they include indirect social costs that can be avoided if systemic collapse is
avoided).
94. Finally, a low interest rate increases incentives for products with high yields, setting the
scene for another innovation frenzy. With regard to the cost of fiscal policy remedies, see supra
notes 51 and 52 and accompanying text. See also Rajan, supra note 15, at 347-48 (discussing
some of the costs of monetary policy intervention in the form of reduced interest rates: these are
effectively a tax on savers, and a boon for those who need liquidity (potentially creating moral
hazard for them-they will come to expect liquidity infusions in future crises and act
accordingly)).
95. See Kysar, supra note 17, at 231 (stating that the practitioners must use the information
and analysis available to them and be confident in their data certainty); see also Mark Van Der
Weide, Implementing Dodd-Frank: Identifying and Mitigating Systemic Risk, ECON. PERSP. 108,
110 (2012) (discussing some of the long-term unquantifiable costs of regulation that inhibit
financial sector activity might be "higher credit costs, lower credit availability, and slower
economic growth").
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precautionary principle are often presented as polar opposites, it is more
useful to think of them as lying on a spectrum with strict empirical cost-
benefit analysis lying at one end and the strongest form of the
precautionary principle lying at the other. By advocating a stronger-
form precautionary approach to financial stability regulation, this
Article is staking out a position that requires the financial industry to
bear the burden of demonstrating when regulation of its activities is
unnecessary. However, it stops short of rejecting all elements of cost-
benefit analysis, or recommending that an insurmountable burden be
created for the financial industry to overcome before they engage in any
activity.
So how would we embed this stronger-form precautionary approach
into financial stability regulation? Legislation relating to the
supervision of banks is already (and has been for over a century)
implicitly precautionary. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), for example, "is charged with assuring the safety and
soundness of [national banks]." 96 Dodd-Frank took a further step in the
precautionary direction with numerous provisions directing financial
regulatory agencies to be mindful of threats posed by all kinds of
institutions (not just banks) to the financial stability of the United
States.97 But to help ensure that Congress' precautionary concerns are
not ignored by regulators or by the courts,98 legislation relating to
financial stability should expressly direct regulators to approach rule-
making from a precautionary, rather than a strict cost-benefit,
perspective. Regulators should face the prospect of having to provide
Congress (or others) with a description of how their rules reflect this
precautionary standard,99 and the D.C. Circuit (and other courts) should
use this precautionary standard in their review of any agency
rulemaking that is challenged as arbitrary and capricious.
To that end, a provision to the following effect could be inserted into
the relevant legislation:
In adopting rules to carry out [legislative provision], [relevant agency]
shall seek to maximize financial stability, and minimize impediments
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012).
97. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing these provisions).
98. Referring to Dodd-Frank, Senator Carl Levin stated "[w]e hope that our regulators have
learned with Congress that tearing down regulatory walls without erecting new ones undermines
our financial stability and threatens our economic growth. We have legislated to the best of our
ability. It is now up to our regulators to fully and faithfully implement these strong provisions."
Johnson, supra note 51 (quoting Senator Carl Levin).
99. Dana, supra note 17, at 1329 (arguing that decision makers should "make and share with
the public" the method and analysis that they used in making their policy decisions).
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to the capital intermediation, risk management, and other socially-
useful functions performed by financial institutions. [Relevant
agency] shall consider whether the benefits to financial stability and
other benefits of such rules justify the costs of such rules; provided
that: (i) there is a rebuttable presumption that the benefits of any rules
proposed or adopted pursuant to this [legislative provision] justify
their costs; and (ii) lack of empirical evidence of such benefits shall
not be grounds for refusal to propose or adopt such rules.
To put this standard in a more concrete context, had it been included
in the Volcker Rule, it would have created a rebuttable presumption that
the benefits to financial stability that derive from a ban on proprietary
trading outweigh the social costs of limiting market-making and risk-
mitigating hedging activities. Any financial institution that wanted
rules that broadly construe the Volcker Rule's exceptions for market-
making and hedging activities would bear the burden of demonstrating
to the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), the
OCC, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") that the
benefits of such exceptions outweigh the costs to financial stability (i.e.,
that regulation of the proposed activities is unnecessary).
Shifting the regulatory burden would help address the informational,
resource, and expertise constraints faced by financial regulators. The
resources of the regulators are dwarfed by those of the financial industry
they regulate, and Dodd-Frank's new focus on systemic risk will only
exacerbate the situation-regulators will now need to collect and
process more, and more complicated, information that relates to
systemic interactions and trends, as well as individual institutions and
products.oo A precautionary approach would ease these regulatory
resource constraints by requiring financial institutions to take the
initiative and approach the regulator if they want activities to be
permitted, rather than the regulator having to scramble to keep up with
financial institutions. Financial institutions could also be directed to
conduct, at their own expense, stress tests and other simulations to test
the potential systemic effects of their activities.
100. See Pan, supra note 36, at 16-18 (noting that limitations on regulatory funding and
expertise currently impact the ability of financial regulators to supervise financial institutions in
two key ways: first, resources are needed to marshal the voluminous information available
regarding regulated transactions and firms. Second, resources are needed to help regulators
process complicated information. With regard to a financial institution that is so large or
interconnected that a problem there will imperil the broader financial system, constant
supervision of that institution's solvency or liquidity will be required, which further taxes
regulatory resources).
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Of course, when a regulated industry provides regulators with
information, there is always potential for regulatory capture issues to
arise. Much has been written about the cognitive capture of financial
regulators since the Financial Crisis, which arises where the regulator
has "effectively internalized the objectives, concerns, world view and
fears of the financial community,"101 rather than looking at the
objectives of society as a whole. Because this cognitive type of
regulatory capture arises not from corrupt requests for favors, but rather
from a type of soft, cultural power,102 it is particularly difficult to avoid.
The phenomenon of cognitive capture is exacerbated by the complexity
of the financial system: complexity creates a type of opacity that
incentivizes regulators to take shortcuts in their understanding of the
many actors and products that comprise the system. 103  In many
circumstances, the most obvious shortcut is to rely on the expertise (and
thus the world view) of the financial institutions that form the financial
regulator's constituency.104
As a potential solution to capture, McDonnell and Schwarcz have
noted the benefits of implanting "regulatory contrarians" within
101. Buiter, supra note 20, at 106. See generally Kling, supra note 19, at 509 (noting that
"[r]egulators, sharing the same cognitive environment as financial industry executives, are
unlikely to be able to distinguish evolutionary changes that are dangerous from those that are
benign"); James Kwak, Cultural Capital and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel
Carpenter & David Moss eds.), available at http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/
files/assets/Kwak%20Cultural%20Capture%20%281.16.13%29.pdf (forthcoming 2013)
(discussing the influence cultural capture had in the recent financial crisis, and the steps that can
be made to use it to prevent a future crisis).
102. It can be called cognitive regulatory capture (or cognitive state capture), because it
is not achieved by special interests buying, black-mailing or bribing their way towards
control of the legislature, the executive, . . .or some important regulator or agency, like
the Fed, but instead through those in charge of the relevant state entity internalising, as
if by osmosis, the objectives, interests and perception of reality of the vested interest
they are meant to regulate and supervise in the public interest. .. . Although the
Bernanke Fed has but a short track record, its too often rather panicky and exaggerated
reactions and actions since August 2007 suggest that it also may have a distorted and
exaggerated view of the importance of financial sector comfort for macro-economic
stability.
Buiter, supra note 20, at 601-02 (emphasis omitted).
103. If regulators are unable to understand an activity, they will be more likely to defer to
what they are told about that activity by financial institutions. See Kwak, supra note 101, at 21
(discussing this in the context of regulators considering the value of VaR models: it was difficult
for them not to defer to "a new theory that, while not practically tested, was supported by famous
economists").
104. "Forced to evaluate opposing arguments that are difficult to compare and often based on
incommensurate policy objectives ... regulators are more likely to resort to proxies such as their
degree of trust in the people making those arguments or their academic pedigree." Id. at 27.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
financial regulatory agencies, who are independent monitors that will
force the agencies to "(1) take an outsider perspective on their work, (2)
consider the opposite outcome to which they are inclined to take, (3)
interact during the decision-making process with persons with differing
backgrounds and biases, and (4) publicly defend their positions."105 In
a similar vein, Kwak has identified a potential solution to the cognitive
capture problem in the form of "institutionalizing independent 'devil's
advocates' within agencies to represent contrarian viewpoints; by
forcing regulators to justify their positions using evidence and reason,
they could reduce the influence of unconscious biases and reliance on
illegitimate proxies."1 06
A precautionary approach takes these proposals one step further: it
essentially directs all agency members to be "contrarians" or "devil's
advocates," coming to the table with the perception that financial
institution activities (such as market-making and hedging activities, in
the context of the Volcker Rule's prohibition on proprietary trading) are
presumptively problematic for financial stability, and therefore in need
of regulation unless the financial institution can demonstrate otherwise.
By creating an adversarial process between the regulators and the
regulated, groupthink is roiled-the regulator no longer self-identifies
as being on the same team as the regulated. 07 Separating the identity
of the regulators from the regulated can make regulators less trusting of
the industry they regulate, and thus more skeptical of industry claims
that their activities are socially useful and pose no harm.10 8 Of course,
105. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 1648.
106. Kwak,supra note 101, at 32.
107. See id. at 27 (noting that "[i]f a regulator sees her job as protecting ordinary people and
believes that financial institutions harm consumers, siding with industry will create psychological
tension"); id. at 16 (stating that the EPA is one of the most oft-cited examples of a regulator that
has not been captured by its regulated constituency, largely because its identity is linked to the
environment it aims to protect, rather than the industry it regulates). But see Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial
Service, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 909, 951 (2011) (arguing that banking supervisory agencies such as
the OCC and the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") have a history of preventing states from
protecting consumers and have been identified as captured agencies).
108. The problems posed by regulatory capture are particularly acute when a country has
reached the peak (or perhaps the nadir) of what Coffee has termed "the regulatory sine curve":
when the economy is doing well, regulators tend to relax regulatory strictures in response to
industry demand because the public has less interest in financial regulatory matters. A
precautionary approach is likely to be particularly valuable at this point in the "sine curve." See
John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need For
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 821 (2011); see also Kwak,
supra note 101, at 14-15 (discussing the impact of the regulator's personal view of themselves on
their work that they perform and the decisions that they make); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra
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given the "revolving door" between financial regulatory agencies and
the institutions they regulate, 109 and the necessity of ongoing contact
between them, it is unlikely that the use of the precautionary principle
will completely prevail over cognitive regulatory capture in the
financial sphere.110 However, a precautionary-inspired disruption of the
shared cognitive identity of financial regulators and financial
institutions is likely to improve the situation.
Regulatory capture also creates collective action problems in that it
causes regulators to give more weight to the concerns of their regulated
industry than to the more diffuse concerns of other members of
society.'11 While almost all members of society have a vested interest
in regulation that improves financial stability, 112 it is difficult to marshal
public support for complex financial stability regulation that cannot be
reduced to sound bytes. Even to the extent that members of the public
do wish to support financial stability regulation, it can be difficult for
such a broad and dispersed group to compete with the influence of the
financial industry, 113 which is highly organized and focused on
note 20, at 1644 (stating that the nature of their work can "blunt regulators' incentives," which
will change how they practice both in public service and industry).
109. It is almost expected that regulators will work within the financial industry after they
complete their public service. Cf Kwak, supra note 101, at 17 (discussing that individuals of
higher status continue to follow paths towards people and positions of high status); McDonnell &
Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 1644 ("[R]egulators will frequently be recruited from the ranks of
industry and/or will go from their government jobs into industry.").
110. And indeed, close interactions between the financial industry and its regulators have
some benefits, in the form of information sharing and cooperation. Kwak, supra note 101, at 29.
111. This access issue is not just a concern at the professional level-"fmancial regulators are
likely to share more social networks with financial institutions and their lawyers and lobbyists
than with competing interest groups such as consumers." Id. at 27.
112. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (discussing the social costs of financial
crises).
113. These collective action issues are similar to those faced in the environmental sphere: "the
bearers of many environmental and health risks are the general public, and the transaction costs of
organizing a large, diffuse population are much higher than the costs of organizing, say, a handful
of auto manufacturers." Dana, supra note 17, at 1332. See generally, MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 166 (1971) ("There are vast numbers who have a common
interest in preventing inflation or depression, but they have no [lobbying group] to express that
interest."); Ben Protess & Mac William Bishop, At Center of Derivatives Debate, A Gung-Ho
Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/at-center-of-
debate-over-derivatives-a-gung-ho-regulator/ (quoting Gary Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC, as
saying the following regarding the CFTC's interactions with lobbyists during the Dodd-Frank
rulemaking process: "[w]e've had about 475 meetings in five months. And since the lobbyists
haven't found us on the weekends (usually), you can do the arithmetic. It's quite a bit. I will say
this: In America, large institutions have a great deal more resources than the investor advocates.
If you looked at those 475 meetings-and we're posting every one of them on our Web site-90-
plus percent are probably larger institutions or corporations").
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avoiding the short-term costs of regulation. 114 The complexity of the
financial system exacerbates these collective action problems as it
allows the financial industry to dismiss the views of outsiders on the
grounds that they "couldn't possibly understand" the complexities of the
financial system."15
The precautionary principle can have salutary effects in these
circumstances. Individuals (regulators included) have a natural bias
towards the primacy of immediate, high-probability events. 116 In the
context of financial regulation, the immediate high-probability event is
an increase in compliance costs for the financial industry.117 This is the
same event that financial industry special interest groups are most
concerned about, and absent a precautionary approach to assessing the
benefits of financial stability regulation, it can be difficult for regulators
not to prioritize such concerns. 118 In this sense, the high level of
organization and singularity of purpose of financial industry lobbyists
intensifies the hardwired cognitive bias that is likely to lead a regulator
to give primacy to the impact of compliance costs, and thus ignore the
interests of a wider, dispersed society in financial stability.119 By
requiring regulators to think more globally about the possible downsides
of a particular financial activity (and to be able to explain such thinking
before Congress), a precautionary approach encourages regulators to
consider a broader, more disparate range of perspectives about what
constitutes social welfare. 120 This in turn could lead to more access to
114. See FCIC Report, supra note 1, at xviii ("From 1999 to 2008, the financial sector
expended $2.7 billion in reported federal lobbying expenses; individuals and political action
committees in the sector made more than $1 billion in campaign contributions.").
115. This notwithstanding that "it has been widely acknowledged that even the most
(ostensibly) sophisticated counterparties failed to grasp the technical nuances of many of the new
instruments and markets made possible by the confluence of advances in financial theory and
information technology." Awrey, supra note 49, at 250.
116. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing the availability heuristic).
117. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 238 (1999) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is inappropriate "where wealth differences
between those who gain from the project and those who lose are substantial enough" (emphasis
omitted)); Dana, supra note 17, at 1322.
118. See Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary, supra note 70, at 1017 ("Sometimes people do
seem to seek certainty before showing a willingness to expend costs, and well-organized private
groups like to exploit this fact. Insofar as the precautionary principle counteracts the tendency to
demand certainty, it should be approved.").
119. Dana, supra note 17, at 1332.
120. See Kysar, supra note 17, at 235 ("The [precautionary principle]'s understanding of cost
is much broader than the notion presupposed by [cost-benefit analysis]."); Sunstein, Beyond
Precautionary, supra note 70, at 1030 (noting that, in some circumstances, the precautionary
principle works well to protect the most disadvantaged sectors of society, with the pragmatic
benefit of "emphasizing the importance of attending to issues ... that might otherwise be
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regulators for other sectors of society:
"[T]he inclusion of the [precautionary principle] in policy and political
discourse provides advocates of regulations with a means to remind
both decision makers and the general public who influence decision
makers of the importance of protecting against unsure, future risks and
the tendency to give such risks too little weight."121
C. Critiques of the Precautionary Principle
This Article thus recommends that the precautionary principle be
incorporated into legislation that relates to financial activities and
stability. However, a variety of criticisms have been leveled at the
precautionary principle in the environmental literature, and it is worth
considering if these have any validity in the financial regulation context.
One such prevalent criticism is that the precautionary principle is too
incoherent and indeterminate to inform any regulatory exercise, whereas
strict cost-benefit analysis provides clarity.122 While it is true that the
precautionary principle is not a formula for precise answers, the
complexity of the financial system (and environmental systems) is such
that precise answers cannot be achieved. Indeed, it is the great
uncertainty as to both the costs and benefits of regulation and regulated
activity that makes the use of the precautionary principle so appropriate
and necessary in these contexts: 123 there are many situations where "we
understand a problem well enough to identify a solution or a limited set
of reasonable solutions, but for which [strict cost-benefit analysis]
would provide limited aid in grappling with a serious problem."1 24
A more nuanced criticism of the precautionary principle is referred to
as the "paralysis" or "risk-risk" conundrum. Essentially the argument is
that the precautionary principle is self-defeating because regulation that
seeks to avoid a risk will necessarily create other substitute risks, and
the precautionary principle is prevented from endorsing these substitute
neglected"); see also id. at 1055.
121. Dana, supra note 17, at 1329-30.
122. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 69, at 10799 (arguing that the precautionary principle is
ineffective because it is not a specific method, but instead several types of approaches depending
on the regulator. Also, the test of identifying the "absolute casual proof of harm" becomes
confusing and inefficient); Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists? The Political Economy of Environmental
Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 315, 333 (2002) ("[T]he precautionary principle
appears to be an incoherent slogan rather than a useful analytical tool.").
123. See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 17, at 231-32 (commenting that "by providing a semblance
of order and exactitude where none exists, the results of [cost-benefit analysis] threaten to obscure
the actual severity of uncertainties regarding many environmental, health and safety risks").
124. DRIESEN, supra note 3, at 8.
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risks by its own internal logic. 125 However, this criticism has no real
relevance except when considering the very strongest forms of the
precautionary principle (i.e., where the proponent of an activity must
show that their proposed activity has no potential for harm before being
able to proceed). The formulation of the precautionary principle
advocated in this Article would not cause any such paralysis: although it
operates to shift the burden of showing that an activity should not be
regulated to the proponent of that activity, the burden of proof that that
proponent must meet is not insurmountable (i.e., there is no need for
them to show that there are no adverse consequences of the activity).
By the same token, regulators can block activities that are, on balance,
likely to be dangerous, notwithstanding that doing so will create some
inadvertent harm by preventing the beneficial aspects of the activity.
Some of the most interesting debates regarding the application of the
precautionary principle are concerned with cognitive biases known as
"heuristics,"l 26 which are default behaviors or "rules of thumb" that
humans tend to employ in the face of complexity.127 One such
cognitive bias is the "availability heuristic," meaning the tendency for
individuals to accord more importance to outcomes that are easily called
to mind.128 In the risk management context, this essentially means that
"[p]eople tend to think that risks are most serious when an incident is
readily called to mind or 'available." 1 29 Some take the view that a
precautionary approach entrenches the availability heuristic, narrowing
the issues considered by regulators by causing them to focus on a
particular type of risk that has primacy in the collective mind, either
because it is more vivid or more recent to the neglect of other harms
perhaps equally grave but not as salient. 130 The concern is that the
precautionary principle thus acts as a vehicle for entrenching society's
irrational fears, 131 and diverts regulators' attention from the systemic
effects of their intervention.132  However, this criticism fails to
125, Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary, supra note 70, at 1004, 1008.
126. Dana, supra note 17, at 1332 ("[B]iases appear, at least in part, to be rooted in the 'hard
wiring' of the human brain, and if that is true, experts are unlikely to ever be wholly free of
biases." (citation omitted)).
127, Haldane & Madouros, supra note 45, at 3.
128. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis ofLaw, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 1175, 1188 (1997).
129. Id.
130. Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary, supra note 70, at 1041, 1043-44.
131. See Frank Furedi, Precautionary Culture and the Risk of Possibilistic Risk Assessment, 2
ERASMUS L. REV. 197, 210 (2009) ("In [the precautionary principle's] search for worst-case
scenarios, it continually raises the stakes and fuels the demand for action.").
132. Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary, supra note 70, at 1049 ("[B]y which people fail to see
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recognize that the most salient harms associated with regulation are
often compliance costs because of their immediacy.133 The starting
point for many regulatory exercises is not neutral, but rather a bias
towards avoiding compliance costs. Reliance on the precautionary
principle in such contexts acts as a correction to the availability
heuristic, broadening regulatory attention to include less-salient, but
more grave, long-term systemic risks.
Another heuristic that interacts with the precautionary principle is the
concept of "loss aversion." Because "people dislike losses far more
than they like corresponding gains ... people tend to focus on the losses
that are associated with some activity or hazard and to disregard the
gains that might be associated with that activity or hazard."1 34 Some
have argued that because of loss aversion, a precautionary approach
tends to neglect the benefits of a regulated activity.135 However, the
applicability of such a critique depends on whether the regulatory
exercise is framed as a contest between the losses and gains associated
with a particular activity or as a contest between two different sets of
losses. The latter frame is probably more appropriate here,136 such that
more immediate losses (the quantifiable costs of complying with a
regulation) are pitted against the more indeterminate future losses (the
losses that may occur if the precautionary regulation is not put in place).
In such a "contest," the loss aversion heuristic favors both sides roughly
equally and the deciding factor is likely to be the availability heuristic.
As such, the immediate losses will likely have more primacy than the
potential future losses, 137 but the precautionary principle works to
refocus regulatory attention on the potential future losses.
the frequent need to weigh competing variables against one another.").
133. Dana, supra note 17, at 1322.
134. Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary, supra note 70, at 1008.
135. Id. at 1009.
136. Dana argues that framing such decisions as a contest between two sets of losses is more
appropriate in the environmental context because "most environmental policy debates entail the
question whether some established economic production, resource extraction, or consumption
process should be prohibited, restricted or made more expensive in order to mitigate or eliminate
an environmental and health risk." Dana, supra note 17, at 1342 (emphasis added). In the
financial context, similar logic would justify viewing restrictions on existing financial activities as
contests between two sets of losses, but it may be appropriate to view ex ante restrictions on new
financial innovations as a conceptual battle between losses and foregone benefits. Id. In such a
contest, it is theoretically possible that the avoidance of systemic risk could be given too much
primacy, but it is likely that loss aversion would be trumped by the availability heuristic, which
trains regulatory focus on the more immediate and tangible compliance costs for the financial
industry. Id.
137. Id. at 1324-26 (relating this primacy to "deep roots in evolutionary biology").
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Finally, the heuristic known as "probability neglect" has been cited as
concentrating regulators' focus on certain bad outcomes,
notwithstanding that those outcomes have a low probability.138 It is
possible that the use of the precautionary principle could cause
regulators to give too much weight to low-probability tail events at the
expense of the benefits of financial activities. However, the
precautionary principle is working against a natural tendency to
underestimate tail events. 139 In the context of complex systems at least,
low-probability, high-impact tail events are the very events with which
regulators are concerned. As a result, a directed bias against neglect of
tail events is likely to be a useful tool in the regulation of such complex
systems. Here, "it seems more likely that the principle undercorrects,
rather than overcorrects."1 40
The precautionary principle, rather than strict cost-benefit analysis, is
therefore more likely to overcome the cognitive biases that unduly focus
regulator attention on the short-term, and thus cause financial regulators
to adopt the long-term and wide-view approach necessary to the
regulation of an ever-evolving financial system.141 Of course, the
adoption of this precautionary approach will not stop regulators from
making mistakes. Indeed, given the complexity of the financial system,
errors are inevitablel 42-the only way to entirely avoid regulatory errors
is to abandon financial stability regulation altogether. However, given
that in the absence of regulation, financial institutions have little
incentive to structure their risk profiles so as to maintain stability,
complete deregulation is not a valid option.143
Recognizing that stability regulation is a necessity, a precautionary
138. Sunstein, Beyond Precautionary, supra note 70, at 1010.
139. See Gennaioli et al., supra note 18, at 14 ("[M]ore likely events are ceteris paribus easier
to retrieve from memory than less likely ones."); Hu, supra note 18, at 1488 ("Individuals tend to
ignore low probability catastrophic events.").
140. Dana, supra note 17, at 1330.
141. Id. at 1319 ("[Tlhe concerns expressed with the aid of the precautionary principle may
prompt a debate and research that otherwise would never occur and that may produce reasonable
safeguards.").
142. See, e.g., McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 20, at 1641 (citing the capital adequacy
standards set forth in Basel II as an example of "deeply considered and deliberate decisions
guided by the most sophisticated understandings of the economy" that still went wrong); Charles
K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326 (2010) (noting that
regulations can also be destabilizing to the extent that they encourage uniformity and thus
heighten procyclicality and correlation of risks).
143. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (noting that financial institutions have
little incentive to preserve financial stability); see also Whitehead, supra note 142, at 358
(arguing that without a certain level of regulation, financial firms will likely assume a socially
irresponsible amount of risk).
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approach to devising rules will generate better outcomes because it
directs regulators to think very broadly about the positive and negative
consequences of the behavior of both financial institutions and
regulators,144 rather than focusing narrowly on the short-term costs of
their regulation. Furthermore, because this precautionary standard does
not require regulators to defend their rules by way of empirical models
of costs and benefits, it allows regulators to make informed value
judgments in the face of uncertainty about what regulation will best
serve financial stability. Such an approach allows simpler and better
regulatory solutions than those developed specifically to withstand cost-
benefit analysis.145
In sum, the advantages of a precautionary approach to financial
stability regulation are manifold. Notwithstanding these advantages,
however, there needs to be sufficient political will to implement such a
precautionary approach. The precautionary principle may find broad
popular support if the true gravity of financial crises are appreciated,146
but the principle is likely to be very unpopular with the financial
industry, to put it mildly. Because of collective action problems, the
financial industry, rather than society at large, is likely to have more
input in the development of financial legislation,147 and the industry is
more likely to support (effectively deregulatory) attempts to entrench
strict cost-benefit analysis. However, it is by no means certain that the
financial industry will benefit in the long-term from such an approach.
While such legislation will help the financial industry avoid compliance
costs in the short-term (and also retain fee-based income from activities
that might otherwise have been limited or banned by regulation), it is
highly likely that these savings will be wiped-out (and then some) in a
144. Regulators can look skeptically at the existing regulatory structure. Charles Whitehead
has argued that the FSOC, as it oversees the work of other financial regulatory agencies, is well
situated to look out for regulatory policies that are, on balance, creating more systemic risks than
they are preventing. Whitehead, supra note 142, at 329-30.
145. See Haldane & Madouros, supra note 45, at 5 (arguing that simple rules are more
effective in achieving financial stability than solutions based on complex mathematical and
economic modeling).
146. There is certainly precedent for the United States populace to embrace the precautionary
principle in exigent circumstances-it did so quite strongly in the context of law and policy
regarding anti-terrorism measures and national security in the wake of September 11. See Furedi,
supra note 131, at 209-10 (noting President "Bush's warning that if 'we wait for threats to
materialize, we will have waited too long"' (citation omitted)).
147. See, e.g., Ryan Grimm, Dick Durbin: Banks "Frankly Own the Place," HUFFINGTON
POST (May 30, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/dick-durbin-banks-frankly
_n_193010.html (discussing Senator Dick Durbin's statement that "the banks... are still the
most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill" and "frankly own the place").
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future financial crisis.148 If financial institutions buy into the notion
that precautionary regulation is about improving long-term stability and
sustainable growth, rather than about foregoing short-term profits, then
perhaps industry opposition could be muted. 149
III. FINANCIAL INNOVATION: A TEST CASE FOR A PRECAUTIONARY
APPROACH TO FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATION
This Article does not propose a detailed practical model for
precautionary review of all activities that can affect financial stability-
it is intended more to inspire a general debate about the approach that
financial regulators and courts should take to financial stability
regulation. However, the practicalities of implementing a precautionary
approach will necessarily inform such a debate. Accordingly, this Part
offers, by way of example, some preliminary insights on how a model
for precautionary review of newly introduced financial innovations
might be structured. 150 While Dodd-Frank makes little attempt to
regulate financial innovation, this Part will demonstrate that such
innovation has the potential to seriously impact financial stability.
Restrictions on financial institutions' ability to engage in innovation
therefore serve as a useful test case for a precautionary approach to
financial stability regulation. The new frameworks for ex ante
148. For example, financial stability allows financial institutions to avoid the interest rate
squeezes in the low-interest rate environments that generally follow crises. See Eric Dash &
Nelson D. Schwartz, In Cautious Times, Banks Flooded with Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/business/banks-flooded-with-cash-they-cant-profitably-
use.html?pagewanted=l&_r-2&ref=business ("In fact, the pressure on spreads poses an even
greater threat to the banks' earnings than the new financial regulations. Oliver Wyman, a
financial services consulting firm, estimates that the industry's deposit revenue will shrink by
more than $55 billion from its precrisis levels, dwarfing the roughly $15 billion in lost fee income
from debit card and overdraft restrictions."); see also Turner, supra note 31, at 15 (noting that
"the impact of increased credit intermediation costs in good years can be offset by a decreased
risk of financial crises").
149. For further discussion of reframing policy decisions as choices between gains, see Dana,
supra note 17, at 1340-41.
150. To be most effective, precautionary regulation of financial innovation should cover all
new financial products, irrespective of who provides them. This means that regulation should be
targeted not only at traditional regulated financial institutions, but also at the shadow banking
industry (otherwise, innovative products may migrate into the unregulated sector). Similarly,
regulation would ideally be international in scope, to prevent regulatory arbitrage between
different jurisdictions. However, the development of international financial regulation and
regulation of the shadow banking industry are extremely complex tasks that go beyond the scope
of this Article. For further discussion of shadow banking, see Gorton & Metrick, supra note 15;
see also Christopher J. Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn't),
99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011) (discussing international coordination of financial regulation including
the purpose, operations, and limitations of financial law).
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regulatory evaluation of financial innovations that have been proposed
by Posner & Weyl and Omarova are a useful starting point in this
endeavor.151
A. Proposals for Regulation ofFinancial Innovation
Given the number and complexity of moving parts in the financial
system, it is already very difficult for regulators to figure out how to
preserve financial stability.152 Innovation introduces new and complex
products into the financial system, which "stresses the capacity of
regulators to keep up and understand how to regulate these
instruments." 153 Regulators not only need to know about the new
products themselves, but also about which institutions are dealing in the
new products and in what volumes.154 Even assuming that regulators
had perfect information, this would be a daunting task. New financial
products are usually thinly traded which means that less information is
available to regulators through the markets.155 Furthermore, much of
the theory and many of the models relevant to evaluating financial
innovations are proprietaryl 56 and often remain unavailable to
regulators until they are outdated.157 As a result, regulators often do not
have access to all of the information about these new products, which
impedes their ability to effectively regulate them.
In a recent paper addressing these types of issues, Posner & Weyl
propose that financial institutions be forbidden to market new financial
products unless such products are approved by a regulatory agency
equivalent to a financial "FDA."158 This agency would not approve a
151. Omarova, supra note 71, at 21-23 (discussing the concept of product approval
regulation); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the
Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Markets, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1307 (2013)
(describing the proposed structure of a Financial Products Agency).
152. Pan, supra note 42, at 42 (discussing the complications of keeping up with the ever-
advancing challenges in financial technology stability).
153. Id. at 35-36.
154. See Hu, supra note 18, at 1506-07 (elaborating on the many benefits of the proposed
institutional mechanism, including: being informed of new products and the institutions using
them, providing information about unpublished models, and increasing the understanding of
regulator knowledge of derivatives and hedging).
155. Id. at 1501 ("Market beliefs are more elusive because they are shaped by trading
practices and the personalities of different traders and their institutions.").
156. Id. at 1498-99; see also id. at 1498 n.241 (noting that "[m]uch of the technical
information may be in the hands of industry" and that "[t]he industry can try to use the
information to influence the agency as a bargaining chip").
157. For a discussion of the delay between developments in derivatives theory and when the
details of those developments are published in academic journals, see id. at 1499.
158. Posner & Weyl, supra note 151, at 1309-10.
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product unless it is deemed socially utile, a determination that would be
based primarily on whether the innovation is intended for hedging or
speculative purposes: in Posner's & Weyl's view, only innovations used
to hedge risk have social utility. 159 In the absence of demonstrable
social utility, Posner & Weyl argue that regulators should ban a new
product. 160 Posner & Weyl's proposal is useful in that it considers
metrics (many of which are based on the number-crunching of publicly
available data)161 that assist determinations of whether a product
genuinely facilitates risk management and/or capital formation or is
lacking in social utility. However, Posner & Weyl note that their model
largely ignores the issues of systemic risk and financial stability1 62 that
are the primary focus of this Article. It is quite possible that a financial
product, even if used for socially utile risk-management purposes, could
create systemic risk. For example, a risk-management innovation could
increase opacity by obscuring the real location of risk or could create
interconnections in the financial system that speed up the transmission
of risk.
In contrast to the Posner & Weyl proposal, Omarova's proposal does
consider issues of systemic risk. Omarova advocates for the creation of
a Financial Product Approval Commission ("FPAC")163 with the
discretion to ban or to conditionally approve new financial products. 164
Under Omarova's proposal, any transaction involving a financial
product not approved by the FPAC would be deemed void and
unenforceable, and any third parties who unknowingly entered into such
transactions would be entitled to damages and rescission rights. 165 The
proposal also sets out a framework for the evaluation of financial
innovations by the FPAC that seems to rely on a precautionary
conceptual framework very similar to that advocated in this Article:
"[t]he applicant entity would bear the burden of showing that the
159. Id. at 1322. This Article will not enter into the ongoing debate regarding the social utility
of speculation.
160. Id. at 1325 (proposing, in some instances, rather than banning a new product, only
restricting the use of the product to those who have some form of "insurable interest" to be
protected by the use of the new product).
161. Id. at 1348-49.
162. Id. at 1312.
163. This Article does not consider in any detail the political, jurisdictional, and
administrative law issues related to granting product review authority to any financial regulatory
agency. Omarova, however, considers these issues in the context of establishing the FPAC.
Omarova, supra note 71, at 65-70.
164. Id. at 68.
165. Omarova suggests that civil and criminal penalties, as well as disqualification from
certain lines of business, might also be appropriate. Id. at 70-71.
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proposed product meets all of the statutory and regulatory criteria for
approval."166
Omarova suggests a tripartite test that the FPAC should use for
evaluating financial innovation. The first part of this test is an
"economic purpose" test: 167 essentially, does the innovation satisfy a
socially useful purpose? To enable regulators to make such a
determination, Omarova suggests that, with a high degree of specificity:
an applicant firm will have to (1) identify the intended market for the
proposed financial product and describe potential users of the product;
(2) show that the product will fulfill a specific business need of
potential "product users," which the existing financial products fail to
fulfill; and (3) demonstrate that this legitimate business need
significantly outweighs any potential uses of the product for
speculative investment or regulatory arbitrage as the core motivation
for the product user (or the applicant firm) to enter into the proposed
transaction. 168
The second part of Omarova's test is an institutional capacity test,
which boils down to the following question: "Do we want this particular
institution to trade and deal in this particular product?"1 69 Regulatory
determinations of institutional capacity would depend on, among other
things, an institution's ability to incur leverage, its business and risk
profile, its internal compliance and management structures, and any
history of enforcement actions. 170
The third part of Omarova's test is a broad "systemic effects" test,
which provides that an innovation will not be permitted if it poses
"potentially unacceptable systemic risk or is otherwise likely to increase
166. Id. at 68.
167. Id. at 52.
168. Id. at 53. Omarova suggests that it might be appropriate to "create a rebuttable
presumption against approving financial products whose identified prospective users include only
financial institutions that ordinarily engage in financial risk management and transfer as part of
their core business." Id. This is an interesting thought that might help address the growth of "too
big to fail" institutions discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 252-53.
169. Id. at 58.
170. Id. at 57. Alternatively, the regulatory approval mechanism could be structured such that
once a product has been approved (conditionally or otherwise), all financial institutions are then
free to issue or underwrite the product (subject of course to any conditions on the approval). That
is not to say that the question of who is using the product is irrelevant-the nature of the users of
financial innovations should be considered as part of the systemic risk inquiry. To address these
systemic risk concerns, financial regulators could potentially create tiered conditions for approval
of new products that would apply more stringently when approved innovations are used by large
and interconnected financial institutions (much in the same way as Dodd-Frank imposes more
stringent requirements on large banks and non-bank financial institutions than it does on other
institutions).
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the vulnerability of the financial system."1 71  This is probably the
hardest part of the determination to put guidelines around. By
necessity, regulators would need to retain a large amount of discretion
in implementing such a test. As Section B of this Part will explore, the
key is for regulators to exercise this discretion in a precautionary
manner. 172 Omarova proposes that regulators be expressly directed to
consider broad public policy considerations, and that the "applicant firm
bears the burden of proving that the financial instrument it seeks to
market is not likely to have a negative impact on broader socio-
economic policies and political goals."1 73  Because this shifts the
regulatory burden to the financial industry and directs regulators to
prioritize (and think creatively about) society's interest in a stable
financial system, Omarova's proposal serves as a good example of how
a precautionary approach might be operationalized.
B. A Precautionary Review of the Costs and Benefits ofFinancial
Innovation
Any ex ante review of financial products is essentially precautionary
because there will never be decisive evidence available regarding the
risks posed by a financial product before such product is introduced into
the market. However, neither Posner & Weyl nor Omarova explicitly
consider whether the precautionary principle should inform the
regulation of financial innovation. 174 Nonetheless, in an article on
financial innovation written shortly after the Financial Crisis, Robert
Litan directly addresses the issue of whether a precautionary approach
should be taken to clearing financial innovations. Litan ultimately
rejects such a precautionary approach, on the grounds that the costs of
"chilling" the financial innovation process are sufficiently great and the
effects of financial collapse are not sufficiently catastrophic. 175 This
Article has already reached the contrary conclusion that the potential
171. Id at 58.
173. See infra Part II.B.
173. Omarova, supra note 71, at 59.
174. Id. at 21 (describing the concept of product approval regulation); Posner & Weyl, supra
note 151, at 1310 n.7 (indicating knowledge of Omarova's corresponding article).
175. [I]f a skeptical view of financial innovation takes hold-either because the benefits of
innovation are perceived to be presumptively small and/or the risks of catastrophic damage
are feared to be non-trivial-then policymakers (and even voters) are likely to demand
some sort of pre-emptive screening and possibly design mandates before financial
innovations are permitted to be sold in the marketplace. This attitude very like would chill
the development of financial innovations that would benefit consumers, homeowners and
investors.
Litan, supra note 18, at 45.
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consequences of a financial crisis can indeed be catastrophic. 176 The
remainder of this Section will consider in detail the concerns Litan
raises about a precautionary approach to chilling innovation by
considering, from a precautionary perspective, the benefits and costs of
financial innovation.
As discussed earlier in this Article, the primary functions of the
financial system are to provide ways of managing risk and to
intermediate capital.177 There is a concern that regulation that chills
future financial innovation has the potential to limit improvements in
the ways risk management and capital intermediation are carried out. 178
It is important to realize that although capital intermediation and risk
management are not beneficial ends in themselves, limitations on the
development of these functions are nonetheless not necessarily costly to
society. Instead, risk management and capital formation need to be
considered in their broader, systemic context; they are useful only to the
extent that they support broad-based sustainable economic growth.
Many of the financial instruments that have been vilified as causing or
exacerbating the Financial Crisis were in fact created to improve risk
management or capital formation, but ended up damaging financial
stability and thus impairing economic growth. For example, a CDS can
be thought of as a risk management tool because it enables the holder of
a debt instrument to pay a CDS issuer to take on the risk that some type
of "credit event" (such as a bankruptcy or a credit rating downgrade)
might befall the issuer of the debt instrument. 179 MBSs are a way of
facilitating capital intermediation because they provide a way for
investors to invest in a pool of mortgages, when those same investors
176. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
178. Rajan has argued that "[t]he expansion in the variety of intermediaries and financial
transactions has major benefits, including reducing the transaction costs of investing, expanding
access to capital, allowing more diverse opinions to be expressed in the marketplace, and
allowing better risk sharing." Rajan, supra note 15, at 314-15. Limitations on innovation could
potentially reduce these benefits; for example, Schwarcz is concerned that an attempt to proscribe
certain types of complex transactions could limit the ability of parties to transfer risk to other
parties more willing to bear it, and thus increase their funding costs. Schwarcz, supra note 22, at
239.
179. A CDS is a derivative instrument that allows the purchaser of the instrument to buy
protection with respect to an underlying debt instrument (the "reference obligation")....
The buyer of the CDS pays a fixed premium (also known as the "spread") to the seller of
the CDS over a fixed period in return for a promise by the seller to pay a fixed amount to
the buyer if a "credit event" (such as a failure to pay, a bankruptcy, or a downgrade by a
credit rating agency) occurs with respect to the "reference entity" that issued the reference
obligation.
Allen, supra note 50, at 153.
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might be loath to invest directly in the individual mortgages. 180
However, notwithstanding their seeming utility, the Financial Crisis
demonstrated that rampant use of CDSs and MBSs posed grave threats
to systemic stability: CDSs increased the amount of leverage and
interconnectedness in the financial system, 181 and MBSs fuelled an
unsustainable housing bubble by generating an uncontrolled appetite for
residential mortgages.182
If legislation were enacted that implemented some type of ex ante
review of financial innovation (and incorporated the precautionary
standard set out in Part II.B) financial innovations would be seen as
presumptively problematic for financial stability. Financial institutions
would then seek to rebut this presumption by demonstrating the capital
intermediation and/or risk management benefits of the proposed
innovation. Regulators would use a two-step inquiry to evaluate
proposals for new financial innovations: first, does the innovation
actually improve capital intermediation and/or risk management in a
socially-utile way; and second, if the innovation does improve capital
intermediation and/or risk management, is that improvement sufficient
to justify any risks to financial stability posed by the innovation. 183
Such an approach implicitly uses the end goal of broader economic
prosperity (i.e., the sustainable growth of the economy as a whole, not
just of the financial sector) as its yardstick: both parts of this two-step
inquiry are examined in detail below.
1. The Social Utility of Financial Innovation
Turning first to the social utility of financial innovation, it is often
180. A security backed by a pool of mortgages is a much more attractive investment
proposition than a single mortgage because the former allows for greater diversification and
liquidity. Kathleen C. Engel & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Complexity, Complicity, and Liability
up the Securitization Food Chain: Investor and Arranger Exposure to Consumer Claims 3-4
(Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-49, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=1951187.
181. For further detail, see infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
182. See Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk Through
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1327,
1331-32 (2009) (observing that private-label MBSs enabled substantial risk borrowing by not
issuing guarantees of credit risk).
183. Adair Turner has articulated a similar framework for evaluating financial activity:
A crucial issue is therefore whether this increased financial intensity has delivered
value added for the real economy-whether it has improved capital allocation,
increased growth, or increased human welfare and choice in ways which do not show
up in growth rates. And whether it has made the economy more or less volatile and
vulnerable to shocks.
Turner, supra note 31, at 6.
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assumed that innovation is inherently good because it completes
markets in response to genuine market demand for new types of capital
intermediation and/or risk management. 184 While this is sometimes
true, authors like Turner and Awrey have challenged the proposition
that this is always the case (and hence that innovation is always socially
utile).185 "That beyond some point, the additional welfare benefit of
providing ever more tailored combinations of risk, return and liquidity
must become minimal."1 86
Awrey's position is that some financial innovations are driven by the
financial institutions that supply financial innovations, rather than by
any investor demand or market need.187 Awrey argues that financial
institutions want a long-term monopoly on the profits of the innovations
they develop, but most financial innovations are not covered by any
intellectual property-type protection that guarantees such a
monopoly.188 Financial institutions can attempt to keep the details of
their innovations secret from other financial institutions, but bankers
move from firm to firm, and product knowledge can be reverse
engineered, so it is difficult to maintain a competitive edge on new
products.189 One way for a financial institution to maximize monopoly
profits is to push new products through as quickly as possible (perhaps
without fully testing them) in order to prolong the narrow period of time
during which the institution has no competition and can thus charge
higher fees. 190 Another way for financial institutions to maintain a
184. "Innovation in financial intermediation improves efficiency by completing markets,
lowering transaction costs, and reducing agency costs." Merton, supra note 27, at 36-37. Adair
Turner describes the ideological background to this position as follows: "the recently dominant
neoclassical school of economics ... has provided strong support for the belief that increased
financial activity-financial deepening, innovation, active trading and increased liquidity-must
be a broadly positive development. This is because more financial activity helps complete
markets. ... [T]he more that innovation allows investors to choose precise combinations of risk,
return and liquidity and the more that trading activity generates market liquidity, the more
efficient and welfare-maximising must the economy be." Turner, supra note 31, at 7.
185. Awrey, supra note 49, at 257-58; Turner, supra note 31, at 22.
186. Turner, supra note 31, at 22.
187. Awrey, supra note 49, at 262. In a similar vein, Haldane & May have argued that even
in the absence of true investor demand for risk management instruments "[s]o long as there is an
incentive to supply new instruments-a positive premium to trading-banks will continue to
expand gross positions, independent of true hedging demand from non-banks. Such trades are
essentially redundant, increasing the dimensionality and complexity of the network at a cost in
terms of stability, with no welfare gain because market completeness has already been achieved."
Haldane & May, supra note 72, at 352.
188. Awrey, supra note 49, at 264-65.
189. Id. at 6, 34. Rajan notes that "excess returns in more traditional investments have been
competed away." Rajan, supra note 15, at 324.
190. Hu, supra note 18, at 1479. For a discussion of the ability of financial institutions to be
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competitive advantage for their innovations is to make those
innovations overly complicated, such that they are harder to reverse
engineer or commoditize. 19 1 Financial institutions can also maximize
monopoly profits by repeatedly introducing into the market tweaked
versions of existing products: "[t]his strategy does not necessarily rely
on the existence of any natural demand in the marketplace, nor on the
innovation itself being 'new' in any material respect. Rather, it can
theoretically be premised on little more than tapping the instinctive
human desire for the 'next new thing."'1 92
While such supply-driven innovations are immediately beneficial for
the financial institutions that generate fees selling the new financial
instruments, they do not necessarily improve capital intermediation or
risk management for the broader economy. Regulation that stifles
purely supply-driven innovations will not be socially damaging. But
even where innovations are driven by genuine investor demand, they
may not have social utility. For example, some innovations that purport
to improve risk management are in fact designed to concentrate risk
with investors who do not truly appreciate the risk that they are taking
on.193 Investors often seek investments that are capable of increased
return without a commensurate increase in risk, but a higher return
usually does require higher risk. 194 To satisfy demand for seemingly
higher-yield, lower-risk products, financial institutions often use
financial engineering to consolidate risk in the taill95 where investors
able to charge an "innovation premium" for a new product, see Utset, supra note 27, at 803.
191. Awrey, supra note 49, at 262-63. This strategy also enables financial institutions to
charge a premium on their analysis and dealer functions: where a product is so complex that only
the developer can understand it, the developer will be the only source of information regarding
that product, and the only entity that can arrange deals involving that product. For further
discussion of the incentives for financial institutions to increase the level of complexity, see
Utset, supra note 27, at 828.
192. Awrey, supra note 49, at 264.
193. Gennaioli et al., supra note 18, at 2.
194. [S]omehow in the effort to define, separate and diffuse those risks, with its familiar
slogan of "slicing and dicing," sight was lost of the fact that this risk ultimately remained,
however much it was relocated and re-priced. In fact, risk sometimes ended up in new
concentrations, hidden from the view of supervisors, and too often from boards of directors
and even top executives.
Volcker, supra note 32, at 3.
195. This means that the chance that the risk will come to fruition is low, but if it does come
to fruition, it is likely to have significant negative consequences. Rajan notes that "[t]ypically,
the kinds of risks that can be concealed most easily ... are risks that generate severe adverse
consequences with small probability but, in return offer generous compensation the rest of the
time." Rajan, supra note 15, at 316; see also Gennaioli et al., supra note 18, at 2 (explaining that
investors, and possibly intermediaries, neglect certain unlikely risks).
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are notoriously likely to disregard it-both because of a human
tendency to ignore tail risk, 196 and because tail risk is often discounted
by mathematical models like VaR that are widely used by financial
institutions to calculate their potential risk exposure. 197 When investors
do not properly recognize the tail risk inherent in a financial instrument,
they are likely to accept a yield that does not properly compensate them
for the risk they are taking on, 198 and the instrument is likely to be
wildly popular (just as MBSs were, prior to the Financial Crisis),199
being "over-issued relative to what would be possible under rational
expectations." 200  Where an innovation is designed to obfuscate
information about its inherent risks, the innovation is tricking the
investor rather than allowing for informed risk allocation. Regulation
that chills such innovations will not be socially costly.
196. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting the natural tendency to underestimate
tail events).
197. VaR, or value-at-risk, is a model for calculating how much a financial institution stands
to lose on its investments on any given day at a given confidence level. For a detailed discussion
of VaR, see Whitehead, supra note 142, at 341-46, 362-64. Most financial institutions use a
form of the VaR model (although each institution tweaks their VaR model somewhat), which
allows each institution to generate a number that is said to represent its risk at any particular time.
However, the VaR model relies on historical data to calculate future risk-"VaR estimates future
losses based on the assumption that the market will perform in the future as it performed in the
past." Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors' Risk Management
Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 71 (2011). As such, VaR discounts low
probability losses that are not reflected in historical data (what constitutes "low probability"
varies from model to model, depending on the historical data inputted and the institution's
confidence level), and therefore the model does not generate an entirely accurate summation of an
institution's risk profile. For further discussion, see Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail
Risk Metric: Disclosures, Derivatives and the Measurement of Financial Risk, 87 WASH. U. L.
REv. 1461, 1462-65 (2010).
198. For further discussion, see Gennaioli et al., supra note 18, at 31.
199. MBSs are generated by applying financial engineering to a pool of mortgages so as to
generate different levels or "tranches" of securities-some riskier than others-from the same
asset pool. Prior to the Financial Crisis, MBSs were structured such that the top tranches
appeared to be risk-free and received the highest possible AAA credit rating (equivalent to U.S.
government bonds). The hidden risk inherent in the top tranches of MBSs only became evident
during the tail event that was the Financial Crisis, when these AAA-rated "super-safe" tranches
proved to be much, much riskier than U.S. government bonds. McCoy et al., supra note 182, at
1331-32.
200. Gennaioli et al., supra note 18, at 5. Such behavior was clearly evident with regard to
derivatives in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis-"in the absence of regulatory oversight, the
eventual innovation frenzy would later fuel a boom beyond all bounds of rational constraint--or
self-discipline." GILLIAN TETT, FOOL'S GOLD 40 (2009). If credit rating agencies are influenced
by the same cognitive biases and financial models as the rest of the financial markets, they may
be equally irrational in evaluating the risks posed by a financial instrument and assign that
instrument a credit rating that does not reflect its real risk profile. With a high credit rating, the
instrument will be more readily accepted as collateral between counterparties, and this will
further increase the popularity of the instrument.
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2. How Financial Innovations Create Systemic Risk
In the absence of any social utility to recommend innovations,
regulation limiting such innovations poses little cost to society and
should be implemented. However, when innovations are created in
response to a genuine investor demand and do make a clear contribution
to capital intermediation or risk management, we must turn to the
second step of our precautionary inquiry and consider whether those
contributions justify any systemic risks posed by the innovation. Of
course, given the complexities involved in determining how the
financial system will react to the introduction of a new type of product,
it is impossible to answer this question definitively. To some extent, the
conclusions drawn by regulators in this second step will reflect value
judgments about the importance of preserving systemic stability, as well
as value judgments about the benefits of an innovation that might be
foregone if that innovation is banned or otherwise regulated. However,
such determinations of potential systemic risk are not completely
unscientific; the experience of the Financial Crisis gives us some
indication of how financial innovations might create systemic risk.
First, financial innovation, which introduces both new actors and new
instruments into the financial system, 201 compounds the complexity of
the financial system.202 Complexity can threaten financial stability
because it increases the interconnectedness of market participants and
the speed with which shocks can be transmitted through the financial
system. 203 Market participants must therefore make decisions very
quickly 204 which leaves little time for reflection, and therefore increases
reliance on common shortcuts like heuristics and computer models in
place of an informed and reasoned opinion of the underlying risk and
value of the product.205 The complexity of the products themselves also
201. Litan, supra note 18, at 5; Merton, supra note 27, at 28.
202. Awrey, supra note 49, at 241. Similar comments have been made with regard to
ecosystems. As more linkages between species are introduced into an ecosystem and those
linkages intensify, the stability of that ecosystem is compromised. Haldane & May, supra note
72, at 351.
203. "[T]he vast array of intricate, evolving and often undetected interconnections within and
between markets and institutions-themselves often the byproducts of financial innovation-
foment systemic fragility and manifest the potential to become channels for the transmission of
contagion during periods of market distress." Awrey, supra note 49, at 275. "In a complex
system, signals are sometimes inadvertently transmitted too quickly to control." Schwarcz,
Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at 215.
204. "Technological innovations, the removal of regulatory barriers to entry, and use of
securitization and other financial products to create deeper and more liquid credit markets, have
greatly magnified the importance of acting quickly." Utset, supra note 27, at 802.
205. "Investment analysts may well be able to intuit risk, but-with limited time available to
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encourages reliance on these same shortcuts,206 particularly if products
are new, unfamiliar, and untested.207  Given that heuristics and
computer models tend to underestimate low-probability high-impact tail
events (such as loss of liquidity) in similar ways, 208 broad-based
reliance on such shortcuts correlates the behavior of actors in the
financial system, making the system more vulnerable to bubbles and
panics.209
devote to risk assessment-a firm's senior managers often want risk to be modeled and reduced
to usable numbers." Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at 224. This is
exacerbated by the automation of the financial process, where computers are programmed to trade
based on certain algorithms without the intervention of any human judgment. Id. at 232; see also
Utset, supra note 27, at 827 (arguing that coordination failure leading to sudden switches in
equilibrium, as well as the fact that lenders bear only part of the losses from financial instability,
is problematic).
206. "As the complexity of financial products increased, fewer analysts possessed sufficiently
nuanced cognition to properly understand and price the products. Trying to do their jobs, many
analysts made oversimplifications usually on the optimistic side because the economy was
expanding. To some extent, these simplifications involved overreliance on heuristics."
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at 223; see also Awrey, supra note 49, at 242
(noting that the complexity of financial markets is "compounded by the nature and pace of
financial innovation"); Dana, supra note 17, at 1332 (discussing the relevance of biases for
technocratic decision making); Rajan, supra note 15, at 315 (arguing that "changes in the
financial sector have altered managerial incentives"); Utset, supra note 27, at 783 (noting that
"the complexity of financial institutions ... creates an incentive for those transacting with a
complex institution to deal with it as if it were a 'black box"').
207. Posner & Weyl argue that "new products are usually the most harmful: since market
participants have had little opportunity to adapt to them, they create the greatest confusion and
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage." Posner & Weyl, supra note 151, at 1354. Gennaioli et al.
have identified a connection between "financial innovation, the glut of new securities, surprise
about risk, and corresponding financial fragility." Gennaioli et al., supra note 18, at 6.
208. Id. at 4; Rajan, supra note 15, at 343.
209. In a good economy, the most recent and salient events for investors will all be positive,
and investors will not have any bad experience with the innovative new product to draw upon.
The result is that estimation of the product will derive less from a reasoned consideration of its
fundamentals, and more from optimistic cognitive shortcuts that undervalue the potential for
associated tail risks to come to fruition. However, the effect of salient bad news will also be
multiplied by these same shortcuts, and bad news that focuses the collective imagination on the
tail risks inherent in the new product has the potential to cause a loss of confidence in, and panic
about, that product. As a result, market discipline on financial institutions is rarely measured and
often takes the form of panic and runs. Admati et al. refer to this as an "inefficient destruction of
asset values." Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer,
Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity
is Not Expensive 30 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No.
86, 2010), available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf dat/2010_42online.pdf); see also Gennaioli et
al., supra note 18, at 15. "Where the informational costs are too great, the resulting uncertainty
can lead to panic and the mass withdrawal of liquidity from the financial system." Awrey, supra
note 49, at 276. Alternatively, if the value an investor places on a product derives more from
understanding and information and less from the cognitive and computer-based shortcuts that are
necessary when dealing with a truly complex product, the product (and the system as a whole)
220 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 45
When such a tail event does occur, market participants are likely to
panic and sell their holdings of innovative new products (and other less
liquid investments) so as to move to more reliable, liquid, and
transparent assets. 210 So-called "fire sales" of products are likely to be
destructive of their value, especially when there is not a deep liquid
market for them.211 To the extent that there is a market for these
products, the financial institutions that originated the products are the
natural buyers, 212 and so these institutions will end up bringing many of
these products onto their balance sheets even as the value of such
products decreases. Furthermore, these originating financial institutions
are likely to have retained the riskiest versions of their products on their
balance sheets from the outset,213 which means that they will have
significant exposure to tail risks even prior to buying back any products
from other market participants. Financial institutions will therefore bear
the greatest losses with respect to innovative new products during tail
events. These losses will impede the ability of such financial
institutions to engage in socially useful capital intermediation and risk
management functions in the long run.214
In addition to increasing complexity, innovations that allow for
improved risk allocation may prove problematic for financial stability if
they increase the amount,2 15 or obscure the allocation,216 of risk within
will be less susceptible to irrational losses in confidence. Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 28, at
xliv.
210. Rajan, supra note 15, at 346.
211. Gennaioli et al., supra note 18, at 24.
212. Id. at 2. In some instances this may be done for reputational reasons, or it may be a
contractual obligation of the banks. For example, prior to the Financial Crisis, Citibank issued
CDOs which had a "liquidity put." This liquidity put allowed buyers of those instruments to
require Citibank to buy them back, should the instruments fail to meet certain performance
criteria. Johnson, supra note 197, at 77. More generally, banks are the traditional providers of
liquidity to the market. Rajan, supra note 15, at 346.
213. Id. at 326. This is especially likely to have occurred if regulators were also blinded to the
real risks of the innovation and accepted low risk-weightings for the instruments for the purposes
of calculating regulatory capital requirements.
214. "Depressed security prices can have especially adverse welfare consequences ex post
because they cut off lending to new investment. A financial crisis leads to an economic crisis."
Gennaioli et al., supra note 18, at 36.
215. Instead of reducing bank risk, risk transfer allows the bank to concentrate on risks so
that it has a comparative advantage in managing, making optimal use of its capital while
hiving off the rest to those who have a natural appetite for it or to those with balance sheets
large enough or transparent enough to absorb those risks passively. It also implies that the
risk held on the balance sheet is only the tip of the iceberg of risk that is being created.
Rajan, supra note 15, at 327.
216. See, e.g., Awrey, supra note 49, at 275 (noting that "[s]ophisticated new instruments ...
structured in ways that obscure the attendant risks ... raise clear investor-protection issues");
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the financial system (CDSs were certainly guilty of this during the
Financial Crisis). 217  Innovations are also problematic when they
facilitate capital intermediation within the financial sector, but do not
really channel investment to the broader economy. 218 These capital
intermediation innovations have the potential to inflate harmful asset
bubbles, particularly by channeling credit flows to non-productive
investments in residential and commercial property219 (only a portion of
this credit goes toward building new properties and the remainder is
invested in existing properties in expectation of asset appreciation and
in order to maximize tax incentives for debt).220 This latter type of
investment does not provide the same kind of socially productive
growth as credit flows that permit other types of investment and
trade, 221 and can fuel real estate bubbles that jeopardize systemic
stability222-just as MBSs did in the lead-up to the Financial Crisis.223
Drawing these threads together, a precautionary evaluation of a new
innovation must weigh on one side the benefit provided by that
innovation in terms of improving socially utile capital intermediation
and risk management, and on the other side any indicia of systemic risk
suggested by the new innovation. These indicia include, but are not
limited to: (i) the extent to which the innovation increases complexity,
(ii) the extent to which the innovation multiplies the amount of risk in
the system, (iii) the extent to which the innovation obscures the
allocation of risk and capital in the financial system, and (iv) the extent
to which the innovation channels capital to what are, on balance, non-
productive investments (especially in real estate). Some of these indicia
of systemic risk could perhaps be dealt with using more traditional
regulatory tools. For example, risk multiplication might be dealt with
by way of increased capital requirements (or other limitations on
leverage), and concerns about hidden risk might be dealt with in part by
Haldane & May, supra note 72, at 351-52 (discussing the literature relating to the destabilizing
effects of hedging instruments like derivatives).
217. Utset, supra note 27, at 825; see also infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text
(discussing pre-Financial Crisis limitations on CDSs).
218. "Perhaps as much as two-thirds of the spectacular growth in banks' balance sheet over
recent decades reflected increasing claims within the financial system, rather than with non-
financial agents." Haldane & May, supra note 72, at 351.
219. Turner, supra note 31, at 17.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Over the years, a large number of financial crises appear to have been precipitated by real
estate bubbles. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 28, at 158-62.
223. McCoy et al., supra note 182, at 1332.
221
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mandating disclosure. Real estate and other asset bubbles could perhaps
be addressed by adjusting interest rates or tax incentives. However, by
trying to tailor regulatory solutions too narrowly to each of the
individual problems posed by financial innovation, we may develop
solutions that are inferior to an ex ante precautionary review scheme: 224
concerns about increases in complexity can only really be dealt with by
controlling the introduction of new innovations into the financial
system.225
C. Ancillary Benefits of a Precautionary Approach to Financial
Innovation
If precautionary ex ante vetting of financial innovation were
introduced, financial institutions would bear the burden of
demonstrating that a financial innovation should be cleared for issuance.
This would alleviate regulatory resource constraints by requiring a
financial institution to approach the financial regulator with all the
relevant information about its new product, rather than the regulator
scrambling to keep up with the innovation process of its regulated
constituency. 226  The regulator would therefore have more timely
information and a broader view of the use of new products in the
financial system.227 Regulators could also require an innovator to
224. See Haldane & Madouros, supra note 45, at 22 (suggesting that when dealing with
complex systems, simpler regulations are often more effective than rules that seek to cater to each
possible eventuality).
225. While regulators should consider an array of regulatory approaches to financial
innovation, they should retain the right to ban a product that has no demonstrable social utility,
poses too much systemic risk, or is simply too complex to understand. Pan, supra note 35, at 45.
An outright ban is likely to be more economical for regulators than trying to understand the issues
posed by a complex product and attempting to tailor appropriate disclosure, clearing, capital, etc.
requirements to it (and then supervising compliance with such requirements). Id. at 43-45.
Furthermore, blunt regulatory action can reduce compliance costs (and provide certainty) for the
regulated industry. Id. at 24-25.
226. Awrey notes that "the pace of innovation has left financial regulators and regulation
chronically behind the curve." Awrey, supra note 49, at 239. Of course, even with an ex ante
approval regime, regulators would still need to devote resources to enforcing the regulatory
requirement that no new product be introduced without regulatory approval.
227. An argument could be made that it would be sufficient to mandate that financial
institutions make disclosures about their new products to regulators. Regulators could then make
systemic risk determinations based on that information. However, as Omarova argues, "[w]ithout
a clear threat of regulatory prohibition on the proposed activity, financial institutions that stand to
gain much profit from that activity will be less forthcoming with the relevant information. In the
context of a purely information-gathering review, it would be more difficult for the regulators to
justify their demands for further disclosure and discussions, over the firms' complaints about
unnecessary and meaningless delays. Routinely issued pre-market regulatory comments on
potential risks of individual financial products, without any binding legal power, are likely to be
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conduct stress tests and consider the systemic consequences of any new
financial product 2 28 and present their findings to the regulator. In this
way, financial institutions would be forced to internalize some of the
costs of evaluating and testing their new products. 229
Of course, if regulators are receiving information about financial
innovation from the financial industry, there is always the concern that
regulators will prioritize that information over information received
from other sources (i.e., that regulators will be captured by the concerns
of the financial industry). However, a precautionary ex ante review
procedure would mitigate the potential for capture in a number of ways.
First, it seems that once financial products become well-established in
the marketplace, regulators are less likely to want to interfere with such
products.230 Because precautionary review would occur prior to the
introduction of a new financial product into the market, regulators
would be less likely to see an innovative product as a fait accompli, and
thus would be more willing to oppose the product (or at least less likely
to endorse it).231 A precautionary approach would also help combat the
tendency towards capture by directing regulators to think more broadly
and creatively about the long-term costs and benefits of a particular
financial innovation (including costs and benefits for stakeholders
outside of the financial industry). 232 Finally, in the face of financial
industry opposition, statutes requiring financial regulators to take a
precautionary approach would enable those regulators to point to a
ignored by market participants and even the regulators themselves, especially in times of rising
asset prices." Omarova, supra note 71, at 139-40.
228. It should be noted that stress tests are not a foolproof method of determining how an
innovative financial product will behave in the future. Stress tests can also neglect tail events in
their simulations. For further discussion of the limitations of stress testing, see Johnson, supra
note 197, at 74.
229. [P]roponents of the precautionary approach perceive it to be a mechanism for reforming
public and private institutions, such that the burden of uncertainty regarding industrial
substances, technologies and processes is distributed in a manner that is believed to be
more equitable, more conducive to the development of vital risk information, and
ultimately, more socially desirable.
Kysar, supra note 17, at 238.
230. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1650 (2008).
231. Kettering uses the repurchase agreement as an example of a financial product that
became so prevalent that the Federal Reserve lobbied legislatures to amend the Bankruptcy Code
in 1984 to ensure that use of the product was protected. Id. at 1642, 1645. Similarly, federal
financial regulators supported (and in some cases, initiated) legislative provisions to exempt over-
the-counter derivatives from the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay, which further encouraged
their growth. Id. at 1648, 1651.
232. Dana, supra note 17, at 1329.
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mandate that authorizes regulating for financial stability, even in the
absence of empirical proof of danger posed by the innovation.
The burden shifting effected by a precautionary approach is also
likely to incentivize desirable behaviors from financial institutions. In
the absence of a precautionary review system, financial institutions have
incentives to rush new products out and do not have incentives to fully
consider the downsides of their products.233 However, if a financial
institution knows that it will need to explain or justify a product to a
regulator, but does not think it will be able do so because the product is
overly complicated or poses significant systemic risk, the financial
institution may abandon or simplify the product without any regulatory
instruction (a regulatory review process will involve time and cost, and
a financial institution will be loath to commence such a process with a
product that does not seem likely to pass muster).234 Furthermore, the
time taken by the regulatory review process effectively inserts a "speed
bump" into the innovation process and erodes the innovation premium
on a new product, leaving less incentive to introduce a new product into
the financial system in the first place. 235 Precautionary regulation may
thus cause a financial institution to abandon an innovation when it has
little to offer but its "newness." This is a desirable outcome because
having fewer and simpler products in the financial system will reduce
the complexity of both the financial system and the financial regulatory
regime that is put in place to police it.236 It is important to note, though,
that the burden for the financial industry is not insurmountable:
innovations that on balance seem sufficiently utile to justify any
concomitant increase in systemic risk will be able to pass the regulatory
hurdle, and be introduced into the markets. However, it is unlikely that
233. Hu, supra note 18, at 1482. "[F]irms deciding whether to allocate more analyst time or
hire additional experts to analyze possible investments might view the added tangible costs as
outweighing the uncertain gain." Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 22, at 221-22.
234. In discussing some of the benefits of forcing banks to disclose to regulators detailed
information about their derivatives positions, Hu noted that it "would force banks to confront
weaknesses in their pricing, risk assessment and hedging systems." Hu, supra note 18, at 1507.
The requirement in Dodd-Frank that systemically important financial institutions develop "living
wills" has similar salutary effects. Because the institutions are forced to explain their structure
and risk profile to regulators, they develop a better understanding of it themselves and may
restructure unbidden. See Richard J. Herring, Wind-Down Plans as an Alternative to Bailouts:
The Cross Border Challengers, in ENDING BAILOUTS As WE KNow THEM 125, 141 (Kenneth E.
Scott et al. eds., 2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/10/10-08.pdf.
235. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (noting that financial institutions can
maximize monopoly profits by pushing new products through as quickly as possible).
236. See supra notes 201-09 and accompanying text (noting that financial innovation
increases the complexity of the financial system, potentially threatening financial stability).
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any such products will escape regulation entirely.
D. Regulation of CDSs in a Parallel Precautionary Universe
This Section takes the foregoing theoretical discussion about a
precautionary ex ante review process for financial innovation and puts it
into a more practical context, by considering how such a review process
would have treated CDSs had it been in place when CDSs were first
developed in the early 1990s. 237 Before the Financial Crisis, the CDS
was heralded by most as "a mechanism for transferring risk efficiently
around the system,"238 and attempts to regulate it were staunchly
rebuffed.239 As the Crisis unfolded, however, the CDS became broadly
vilified as a "weapon of mass destruction," 240 and calls to regulate
CDSs intensified and culminated in the enactment of Dodd-Frank, Title
VII of which deals with the regulation of over-the-counter ("OTC")
swaps (including CDSs). A brief sketch of the history of swaps
regulation in the United States suggests how a precautionary approach
might have mitigated the damage done by CDSs during the Financial
Crisis.
In May of 1998, Brooksley Born, Chairperson of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, issued a concept release seeking input
regarding the regulation of CDSs and other OTC derivatives. The press
release accompanying the concept release stated:
While OTC derivatives serve important economic functions, these
products, like any complex financial instrument, can present
significant risks if misused or misunderstood. A number of large,
well-publicized financial losses over the last few years have focused
the attention of the financial services industry, its regulators,
derivatives end-users and the general public on potential problems and
abuses in the OTC derivatives market. Many of these losses have
come to light since the CFTC's last major OTC derivatives regulatory
actions in 1993.
237. For a discussion of the development of CDSs, see TETT, supra note 200, at 46-56.
238. Tim Frost, former European Head of Credit Trading, Sales and Research at JPMorgan, as
cited in id. at 86.
239. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text (discussing this point).
240. Warren Buffett famously used this phrase to describe derivatives in a 2002 letter to
Berkshire Hathaway investors: "derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying
dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal." Once the financial sector began to melt
down in 2008, Buffett's words were cited increasingly often with respect to CDSs. See, e.g., Ben
Stein, In Financial Food Chains, Little Guys Can't Win, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28every.html?fta=y; The Bet That Blew Up Wall
Street, CBS NEWS (Oct 26, 2008, 5:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/26/
60minutes/main4546199.shtml.
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In view of these developments, the Commission believes it is
appropriate to review its regulatory approach to OTC derivatives. The
goal of this reexamination is to assist it in determining how best to
maintain adequate regulatory safeguards without impairing the ability
of the OTC derivatives market to grow and the ability of U.S. entities
to remain competitive in the global financial marketplace. In that
context, the Commission is open both to evidence in support of
broadening its existing exemptions and to evidence of the need for
additional safeguards. Thus, the concept release identifies a broad
range of issues in order to stimulate public discussion and elicit
informed analysis. The Commission seeks to draw on the knowledge
and expertise of a broad spectrum of interested parties, including OTC
derivatives dealers, end-users of derivatives, other industry
participants, other regulatory authorities, and academicians. 241
This press release is certainly mindful of the costs of regulation
(seeking not to impair the growth of the OTC derivatives market or
United States competitiveness), but it is also somewhat precautionary in
that it is concerned with the significant unknown risks that might result
from the misuse or misunderstanding of OTC derivatives. Furthermore,
the press release seeks viewpoints from both within and outside of the
regulated industry, in accordance with the broader interest perspective
dictated by the precautionary principle. However, there is no attempt to
require the financial industry to show that regulation is unnecessary-
the CFTC clearly means to retain the burden of showing that regulation
is necessary, and accordingly, this press release could only be construed
as being informed by a weak version of the precautionary principle.
However, the CFTC faced significant backlash over this concept
release; the industry harshly condemned the application of even a
weakly precautionary approach to OTC derivatives. More unusually,
other regulators also publicly condemned the CFTC's concept release
on the grounds that the derivatives markets were so efficient and
sophisticated that no government intervention was necessary. 242 As a
result, CDSs and other OTC derivatives remained largely unregulated
prior to the Financial Crisis.
241. CFTC Issues Concept Release Concerning Over-The-Counter Derivatives Market,
Release No. 4142-98 (May 7, 1998), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opa4142-98.htm
[hereinafter CFTC Release].
242. The Treasury Secretary, Chairman of the SEC and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
all publicly criticized the CFTC's attempts to revisit regulation of OTC derivatives in 1998.
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan went so far as to say that "[a]side from safety
and soundness regulation of derivatives dealers under the banking and securities laws, regulation
of derivatives transactions that are privately negotiated by professionals is unnecessary." FCIC
Report, supra note 1, at 47.
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It appears that regulatory capture at least partially informed the
decision not to regulate OTC derivatives. In an interview with the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Former Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin stated that he was not personally opposed to regulation of
OTC derivatives, but that "very strongly held views in the financial
services industry in opposition to regulation" could not be overcome. 243
In contrast, had precautionary legislation been enacted prior to the
development of CDSs, the default position with regard to financial
innovation would have been to regulate it. Financial industry members
seeking to avoid regulation of CDSs would therefore have had to take
an adversarial position against the CFTC, essentially having to
challenge it, rather than simply co-opt it. In our parallel precautionary
universe, the CFTC would not have presumed CDSs to be beneficial
solely because they facilitated risk management. The CFTC would also
have considered the way CDSs facilitated risk management and whether
CDSs obscured real risk allocations in a way that threatened financial
stability.244 In effect the CFTC would have been directed to act as
advocate for those who had a stake in financial stability but could not
influence the rulemaking process because of collective action
problems. 245
Because a precautionary approach shifts the onus to the regulated
industry to demonstrate that regulation is unnecessary, and because
regulators would have started from the position that innovations like
CDSs create complex and unknowable interactions within the financial
system, it is highly unlikely that the industry would have been able to
entirely avoid regulation of CDSs if a precautionary philosophy had
applied at the time CDSs were first introduced to the market. Of course,
there is no way of knowing what form regulation of CDSs would have
taken in a parallel precautionary universe. But any regulation would
likely have addressed one of the key problems posed by CDSs in the
243. Id. at 49. This response can perhaps be explained by the theory posited by Kettering that
financial product classes themselves can become "too big to fail." Essentially, when use of a
financial product has grown so that it has a very large market presence, there is insufficient
political will on the part of regulators to shackle further growth or profitability of that financial
product. Kettering, supra note 230, at 1645.
244. Discussing CDSs, Utset comments that they "allowed institutions to insure against
contract-specific and firm-specific counterparty risks and, therefore, increased their ability to
transact blindly." Utset, supra note 27, at 825.
245. While the CFTC's instinct was to seek some input from persons outside of the financial
industry (such as other regulators and academics) with regard to whether over-the-counter
derivatives should be regulated, CFTC Release, supra note 241, our precautionary approach
would have directed the CFTC to go further in considering the views of non-represented
stakeholders.
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Financial Crisis: their multiplier effect. This multiplier effect arises
because a CDS is an instrument that derives its value from an
underlying debt instrument, but the purchaser of the CDS is not required
to have any interest in the underlying debt instrument.246 Prior to the
Financial Crisis, the only limitation on the number of CDSs that could
derive their value from a single debt instrument was the willingness of
CDS sellers to issue those CDSs, and because sellers received
immediate income flows from CDS premiums and were not required to
hold capital or any other reserve against their CDS positions,247 they
had little incentive to stop issuing CDSs. 248 This meant that investors
could purchase almost unlimited CDSs that derived their value from one
single debt instrument: if that debt instrument defaulted, payment
obligations under numerous CDSs would be triggered, multiplying
exponentially the amount of market exposure to the default by the issuer
of that underlying debt instrument.249
In a parallel precautionary universe, had there been a requirement
that CDS purchasers have an "insurable interest" in the underlying debt
instrument2 50 or any regulatory capital or margin requirements for
CDSs, such measures would almost certainly have reduced the number
of these instruments in the market, and therefore put some limit on the
multiplier effect of CDSs and the level of interconnectedness of
financial market participants. As an alternative or a complement to
such regulatory requirements, Johnson has argued that had mandatory
clearing of CDSs been required prior to the Financial Crisis, it would
have limited the number of CDSs issued. 251 Mandatory clearing would
also have improved the transparency of CDS markets prior to the
246. FCIC Report, supra note 1, at 50.
247. "AIG, the largest U.S. insurance company, would accumulate a one-half trillion dollar
position in credit risk through the OTC market without being required to post one dollar's worth
of initial collateral or making any other provision for loss." Id. at 50.
248. Richard Portes, Ban Naked CDS, ECONOMIST'S VIEW (Mar. 19, 2010, 12:42 AM),
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2010/03/ban-naked-cds.html.
249. JOHN GEANAKOPLOS, SOLVING THE PRESENT CRISIS AND MANAGING THE LEVERAGE
CYCLE 16 (2009), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edulcdnmedia/feic-testimony/2010-
0226-Geanakoplos.pdf.
250. Posner & Weyl, supra note 151, at 1334.
251. [I]f market participants had been required to clear credit default swap transactions
during the years before the crisis, it is unlikely that AIG would have entered into such a
significant volume of credit default swap agreements acting as a protection seller without
triggering at least an investigation into its collateral accounting policies and its ability to
satisfy obligations under the agreements.
Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U.
COLO. L. REv. 167, 238 (2011).
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Financial Crisis: in the absence of any such clearing or disclosure
requirements, regulators had no informed idea of the extent to which
financial institutions were linked to each other by CDS exposures, nor
did they know whether interconnected parties could net out their
notional CDS exposures. This made it very difficult for regulators to
predict the systemic consequences of the failure of large derivatives
counterparties like AIG or Lehman Brothers-this opacity also
frightened private investors. Any regulation mandating clearing or
disclosure with respect to CDSs would have improved the informational
situation for both regulators and regulated, reducing to at least some
degree their susceptibility to panic.
It seems that had CDSs been regulated from the outset, there would
have been less leverage and more transparency in the financial system.
Of course, there would also have been some costs associated with such
regulation. Most obviously, the fees earned by the major derivatives
dealers were very lucrative and some of these would most certainly
have been forfeit had derivatives been regulated. However, this private
cost might actually have improved systemic stability; to fully participate
in the financial innovation process, institutions tend to need strong
institutional customer relationships and large amounts of capital.252 As
a result, only a small number of players could truly reap the rewards of
innovating derivatives, 253 and those rewards contributed to the
increasing size of those players-without fees from derivatives dealing,
the growth of "too big to fail" financial institutions might have been
impeded. The private costs of CDS regulation would therefore not have
given our parallel universe regulators too much pause, but the public
cost of regulation-being the cost associated with limiting the use of
CDSs as a tool for risk management-would have been something that
regulators needed to weigh seriously.
The social utility of CDSs as risk management tools is a subject of
hot debate. Some take the view that CDSs were a groundbreaking
innovation in risk management, in that they allow people to hedge
exposure to thinly-traded debt instruments that would otherwise be very
difficult to hedge.254 CDS advocates argue that even speculative use of
CDSs (i.e., "naked" CDSs, where the purchaser of the CDS has no
exposure to the underlying debt instrument) is beneficial because it
252. Rajan, supra note 15, at 330-31.
253. FCIC Report, supra note 1, at 50.
254. Litan, supra note 18, at 41-42.
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provides liquidity and serves an informational signaling function.255 In
contrast, detractors view the utility of CDSs as a hedging tool more
skeptically, concluding that the instrument is devoid of any real use
other than antisocial speculation. 256 Others take the middle ground, and
believe that "covered" CDSs that are used for hedging are a useful
innovation, whereas naked CDSs have no social utility and should be
banned.257 In our parallel precautionary universe, the CFTC would
have had to consider all of these opinions and make an informed value
judgment about the utility of CDSs.
It is by no means clear what the CFTC would have decided.
However, if the CFTC had concluded that the CDS had no social utility,
or if the CFTC had concluded that the CDS had some social utility but
that that utility was outweighed by the added complexity, then CDSs
would have been banned. The damage they inflicted during the
Financial Crisis would thus have been avoided. Alternatively, if the
CFTC concluded that CDSs had sufficient social utility that a ban
should not be put in place, the precautionary philosophy would have
counseled the CFTC to err on the side of protecting systemic stability
by imposing at least some regulation on CDSs (perhaps by mandating
insurable interest, margin, disclosure, or clearing requirements). These
types of regulations would have mitigated the multiplication and
obfuscation of risk occasioned by CDSs in the lead-up to the Financial
Crisis, and the Crisis would have been less severe.
Going forward, if we fail to embrace a precautionary approach and
instead adopt legislative proposals that require strict cost-benefit
analysis of any rule purporting to regulate financial innovation (or allow
the courts to impose such requirements indirectly by way of
administrative review of agency rules), then the financial innovation
process will essentially remain unregulated, leaving the financial system
unprotected against the next CDS.
CONCLUSION
This Article has established that financial stability regulation should
be formulated from a precautionary perspective. A precautionary
approach, rather than strict cost-benefit analysis, is necessary to address
the complexities inherent in the financial system, the interests of
dispersed stakeholders in financial stability, and the tendency of both
255. Id.
256. Posner & Weyl, supra note 151, at 1332.
257. Portes, supra note 248.
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regulators and the financial industry to ignore the frequency and gravity
of financial crises. By shifting the burden to financial industry
participants to demonstrate that their activities should not be regulated,
strains on financial regulatory agency resources will be reduced, and
those agencies will be less susceptible to capture by the financial
industry. There will, of course, be practical challenges inherent in
operationalizing a precautionary approach to regulation of activities that
affect financial stability. The proposals made by Posner & Weyl and
Omarova with regard to ex ante regulation of financial innovation are a
good start-however, much more work is needed. The hope is that this
Article will spark a debate about the philosophy underlying financial
stability regulation, amass public support for a move towards
consistently precautionary financial stability regulation, and inspire
academics and policymakers to devote time and thought to the
operationalization of a precautionary approach to other financial
activities.
